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  INTRODUCTION  
Family law assumes that parents do what is best for their 
children—that ties of biology and love position parents to be op-
timal caregivers.1 Indeed, parents’ rights to the care, custody, 
and control of their children are fundamental rights in Ameri-
can constitutional law,2 implicitly positioning children’s inter-
ests as identical to those of their parents. Under this parental 
rights paradigm, parents are the chief decision-makers, and 
state intervention in the family infringes primarily on their 
rights.3
But parental rights are not absolute, and exceptions to the 
parental rights paradigm do exist. Despite the broad liberties 
parents have in childrearing, the state limits those rights when 
parents cause harm to their children and no longer observe a 
minimal degree of care for them.
 
4
 
 1. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (“[T]here is a pre-
sumption that fit parents act in their children’s best interests.”). 
 The most notable situations 
 2. E.g., id. at 70; Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254–55 (1978); Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218–19 (1972); Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of 
the Holy Names, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390, 400 (1923).  
 3. See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68–69 (suggesting that when a state in-
terjects itself into the realm of the family the state questions the ability of the 
parent). 
 4. MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS? 36 
(2005). 
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of state intervention to protect children from their parents are 
cases of abuse or neglect. Laws pertaining to abuse and neglect 
are broadly crafted to encompass different types of harm—
physical, sexual, and psychological.5 Parents who compromise 
their children’s best interests may find their parental rights 
limited in custody disputes as well.6 Exceptions to the parental 
rights paradigm are not only concerned with preventing harm 
to children, but also recognize that, in some instances, parents 
are not the best decision-makers for their children.7
The legal system has carved out exceptions to the parental 
rights paradigm, acknowledging that, occasionally, not only do 
the interests of parents and children diverge, but following the 
parental rights paradigm may be detrimental to the child.
 This Arti-
cle asks whether protecting children’s identity development, a 
task at the center of children’s self-determination and emotion-
al well-being, might warrant a new exception to parental 
rights.  
8
  
 The 
law has recognized that, in some cases, children have the ca-
pacity, and thus the right, to autonomous decision-making. 
Legislators and courts have granted decision-making rights to 
children seeking care for pregnancy prevention and termina-
tion, HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections, sub- 
 
 5. MARTIN GUGGENHEIM ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF FAMILIES 94–95 (1996). 
 6. Courts have restricted divorcing parents from raising their children 
according to their religion when that is not in the child’s best interest, as well 
as prohibited parents from engaging in non-marital sexual relationships dur-
ing and after the divorce. See infra notes 30–32 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
 8. Justice Douglas’s dissent in Wisconsin v. Yoder first expressed the 
idea that children should be able to voice and receive legal protection for their 
interests even when their wishes diverge from their parents’. 406 U.S. 205, 
245–46 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Though not the majority opinion, Jus-
tice Douglas’s dissent inspired many of the concepts around children’s rights 
and opened our eyes to the possibility that children’s interests may not always 
align with parents’ and that the parental rights paradigm might give rise to 
abuses. SAMUEL M. DAVIS ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 157 (3d ed. 
2004). He seeks to give children the opportunity to assert their independent 
interests so that courts can give them adequate consideration. It is important 
to note that Douglas would not tip the scale in favor of children, but rather 
would allow for exceptions when parents’ and children’s interests conflict. See 
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 246 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The child, therefore, should 
be given the opportunity to be heard . . . .”). 
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stance abuse, and mental health.9 Allowing children to make 
their own decisions in these instances encourages children to 
seek and receive medical attention when parental involvement 
is a highly sensitive matter and could jeopardize the children’s 
welfare or their relationship with their parents.10
While all of the exceptions to the parental rights paradigm 
are a significant step toward children’s autonomy and safety 
from parental harm, they are limited to very few aspects of 
children’s lives. These exceptions are unable to address a range 
of situations where parental conduct overly burdens children’s 
self-determination and compromises children’s safety and well-
being. This Article thus aims to explore one area where the law 
should carve out an additional exception: family conflicts 
around children’s identity interests—children’s freedom to de-
velop, express, and pursue their identities.
  
11 Parents may re-
spond negatively, indeed violently, when children develop or 
assert identities that diverge from their own or from their 
views of what a child’s desirable identity is. I explore this ten-
sion between children’s identity interests and parental rights, 
particularly in the area of children’s sexual orientation12 and 
gender identity13
 
 9. Cara D. Watts, Asking Adolescents: Does a Mature Minor Have a Right 
to Participate in Health Care Decisions?, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 221, 235–
36 (2005); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643–44 (1979) (reiterating 
minor girls’ abortion rights and establishing a judicial bypass process in which 
minors who have not secured parental consent to an abortion may petition 
courts instead); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 
72–75 (1976) (extending abortion rights to minor girls without requiring them 
to consult, or even notify, parents); Newmark v. Williams/DCPS, 588 A.2d 
1108, 1110, 1116–17 (Del. 1991) (ruling, in a dispute between Christian Scien-
tist parents and the child welfare system over the treatment of a three-year-
old with cancer, that parents may not sacrifice their children’s life and health 
in the name of religion before the child is old enough to make that decision for 
herself, and proceeding to a “best interests” analysis). 
 because of the rampant victimization of lesbi-
 10. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 157–58. 
 11. Psychology defines identity as a sense of who we are, what we value, 
and where we are headed. See CHARLOTTE J. PATTERSON, CHILD DEVELOP-
MENT 543 (2008). Our identity is related to those biological traits or social 
background that “involve[] learning about, relating to, and committing to, so-
cially constructed meanings associated with [those] biological [or social] sta-
tus[es].” Holning Lau, Pluralism: A Principle for Children's Rights, 42 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 317, 331 (2007).  
 12. “Sexual orientation” is one’s predisposition or inclination toward a 
particular type of romantic or sexual partner, activity, or behavior. BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1407 (8th ed. 2004).  
 13. “Gender identity” is one’s psychological understanding and expression 
of one’s gender as male, female, both, in between, or neither. The Sylvia Rive-
ra Law Project (SRLP), a New York City-based nonprofit organization that 
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an, gay, bisexual, or trans (LGBT) youth in the home, in socie-
ty, and in the law.14
My purpose in this project is to offer a framework for ana-
lyzing what makes LGBT youth vulnerable at home and how 
the law can alleviate that vulnerability by creating a new ex-
ception to the parental rights paradigm—the “Family in Need 
of Services” framework.
 
15 My analysis relies heavily on a vo-
cabulary of assimilation demands as introduced by Professor 
Kenji Yoshino.16 Yoshino criticizes assimilation as costly to the 
authentic self—denying one the freedom to develop an identity 
independent of pressures to conform to mainstream society.17
 
provides legal services to the transgender community, defines “gender identi-
ty” as “how we see ourselves. Some of us see ourselves as women, some as 
men, some as a combination of both, some as neither. Some of us have complex 
identities that may even be fluid and change over time.” Jody Marksamer & 
Dylan Vade, Trans 101, SYLVIA RIVERA L. PROJECT, http://srlp.org/resources/ 
trans-101 (last visited Mar. 11, 2014). SRLP describes “transgender” (or 
“trans”) as “people . . . whose gender identity and/or expression . . . does not 
. . . match stereotypical gender norms associated with our assigned gender at 
birth.” Id. I will mostly use the terms “trans” or “gender nonconforming” to re-
fer to people who do not conform to “traditional” or “expected” gender presen-
tation. “Those who are gender nonconforming may or may not identify as part 
of the trans community or as part of any sexual minority group, such as the 
lesbian and gay communities.” Jody L. Herman, Gender Regulation in the 
Built Environment: Gender-Segregated Public Facilities and the Movement for 
Change in Washington, DC, A Case Study Approach 4–5 (May 16, 2010) (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, The George Washington University) (on file with 
author).  
 
 14. These areas of victimization are discussed further in depth below. See 
infra Part I.A.1. 
 15. A note on terminology: the term I use is inspired by the equivalent 
“child in need of services,” “child in need of supervision,” or “person in need of 
supervision.” Different states use any of these terms to refer to the framework 
dealing with an “incorrigible” child and subjecting her to state intervention in 
an attempt to correct her behavior and return her to her parents’ custody. Be-
low, I use them according to their use in a specific state (i.e. if State A uses 
“child in need of services,” so will I; if State B uses “child in need of supervi-
sion,” so will I). They all have the same legal meaning, and I find all these 
terms to connote blame toward the child for the family’s dysfunction. Because 
I prefer avoiding blame, particularly toward the child, and because I am in 
search of a holistic solution to parental assimilation demands, I use “family in 
need of services” for my proposal. I believe this is a better use of this term 
than that used by the State of Arkansas, which uses it to refer to, essentially, 
proceedings around an “incorrigible” child, rather than its purported presenta-
tion to offer services to families as a whole. Rachel A. Runnels, Family Law 
and Practice, in 5 ARKANSAS PRACTICE SERIES § 17:1 (2013). 
 16. See generally KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON 
OUR CIVIL RIGHTS (2006) (developing a theory of the legal and social costs of 
coerced assimilation throughout the book). 
 17. Id. 
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He analyzes assimilation demands on children where the law 
imposes them on LGBT parents (and thus vicariously on chil-
dren) out of concern that children might develop sexual minori-
ty identities.18 When gay or lesbian parents are involved in cus-
tody disputes with former different-sex partners, these lesbian 
or gay parents tend to prevail only when they downplay their 
sexual orientation to the court and conceal it from their chil-
dren,19 thus mitigating courts’ concerns about the outcome of 
children’s sexual orientation. Anxiety that children will develop 
sexual minority identities motivates restrictions on LGBT par-
ents’ custody rights in an attempt to curb children’s undesira-
ble non-heterosexual identities.20 This fear of potential non-
heteronormative children insidiously affects LGBT youth 
themselves because it condones adults’ assimilation demands. 
In Yoshino’s example of family assimilation demands on chil-
dren’s sexual identity,21 the assimilation demands are super-
imposed by courts.22
 
 18. According to Yoshino, adults presume children to be “sexual waverers” 
who must be protected from developing an unfavorable sexual minority identi-
ty. Id. at 44. As this Article demonstrates, many parents, therefore, try to di-
rect the outcome of their children’s sexual identity, sometimes by such aggres-
sive means as abuse or neglect. 
 Parents cooperate—presumably reluctant-
ly and at high costs—in order to retain parental rights.  
 19. Id. at 101–03. 
 20. See Clifford J. Rosky, Like Father, Like Son: Homosexuality, 
Parenthood, and the Gender of Homophobia, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 257, 
296–97 (2009). 
 21. To maximize inclusion of identities and their expressive conduct, I use 
the term “sexual identity” to refer to either or both sexual orientation and 
gender identity throughout this Article.  
 22. See YOSHINO, supra note 16, at 101–03. Clifford Rosky offers further 
explanation about courts’ concern that LGBT parents will produce LGBT chil-
dren, and about how this concern motivates courts’ severe restrictions on 
LGBT parents’ parental rights. Rosky, supra note 20, at 257. Analyzing almost 
200 opinions, Rosky found three stereotypes about lesbian and gay parents 
that courts employ against them in custody decisions: that gay fathers are mo-
lesters; that gay fathers are infectors/carriers of sexually transmitted infec-
tions; and that both gay fathers and lesbian mothers are “recruiters” or “role-
models.” Id. at 262. According to the last set of stereotypes, LGBT parents en-
courage their children to adopt LGBT identities by “taking them to pro-gay 
events and exposing them to pro-gay media” (recruiters) or by “providing in-
fluential models of same-sex relationships” (role-models). Id. at 294. Both ste-
reotypes are rooted in the same implicit concern that children of LGBT par-
ents are more likely to develop LGBT identities because children are 
presumed sexual waverers who mimic adult relationships, primarily those of 
their parents. Rosky found that straight parents used these stereotypes as a 
litigation strategy against LGBT parents in 28% of cases studied, and that 
courts accepted such arguments in 90% of those cases. Id. at 296–97.  
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Yet so far, Yoshino and other legal scholars have not com-
mented on the assimilation demands children suffer at home 
independent of courts’ pressures on LGBT parents. This Article 
fills that gap in the literature by exploring assimilation de-
mands that are rooted in parents’ own desires for children’s 
heterosexuality and gender conformity, and their animus to-
ward sexual minorities. Examples of assimilation demands in-
clude verbal harassment and name-calling,23 threatening a 
child with rape in order to “cure” her same-sex attractions,24 
blocking access to LGBT friends, partners,25 or support 
groups,26 or subjecting the child to conversion therapy.27
 
 23. See, e.g., In re Shane T., 453 N.Y.S.2d 590, 591 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982).  
 These 
assimilation demands range in their severity, with physical 
beatings and conversion therapy falling in the extremely egre-
gious end of the spectrum. However, since children experience 
assimilation demands as a form of family rejection, milder as-
similation demands may often harm children as well. This Ar-
ticle will focus on the more subtle assimilation demands that 
the law has yet to effectively address. With the premise that 
non-heteronormative identities ought not to be disfavored, de-
valued, or delegitimized by society or the law, this Article chal-
lenges how families, at their own will, pressure children into 
mainstream sexual identities. Such conduct harms children, in-
fringes upon their identity interests, compromises their self-
determination, and should join the existing categories of excep-
tions to parental rights. A critical examination of reasoning in 
the few cases in which courts have considered assimilation de-
mands made on children reveals that children’s identity inter-
ests are currently under-protected in the law. This Article pro-
poses a new framework that courts could use to analyze cases 
involving children’s identity interests and parental assimilation 
demands. This framework would develop a jurisprudence better 
suited to children’s needs and identity interests.  
 24. See, e.g., C.O. v. B.C., No. B206425, 2008 WL 4670513, at *1 (Cal. 
App. Oct. 23, 2008). 
 25. See, e.g., Landreneau v. Fruge, 94-553, p.13 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/12/96); 
676 So. 2d 701, 711 (Thibodeaux, J., dissenting) (blocking access to partner by 
reporting relationship to authorities). 
 26. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, No. 05 JE 42, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 1282, 
at *3 (Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2007). 
 27. Conversion therapy (also “reparative therapy” or “ex-gay therapy”) at-
tempts to eliminate one’s same-sex sexual orientation through counseling and 
is generally practiced by religious groups. See infra note 139.  
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This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explains 
Yoshino’s theory of assimilation demands and demonstrates 
why these demands are so harmful to children, particularly to 
LGBT youth. It then provides an overview of the case law to 
show how assimilation demands cases have fared in courts and 
concludes that while courts attempt to protect children’s identi-
ty interests—with some even ruling such interests are funda-
mental rights—the de facto results of these cases under-protect, 
and even harm, children. Part II addresses current family law, 
including abuse and neglect, and “child in need of services” 
(CHINS) jurisprudence, and finds both inadequate to protect 
children’s identity interests from parental assimilation de-
mands. Part III details how courts are to distinguish acceptable 
parental behavior from assimilation demands, proposing that 
courts restrict parental behavior that is strictly coercive and 
sufficiently harmful to the child. Next, Part III proposes the 
“family in need of services” (FINS) framework as an alternative 
to CHINS that preserves family cohesion and suggests media-
tion as one practical tool for constructive, less adversarial dis-
pute resolution. Part III concludes by contending with possible 
concerns to the arguments and proposals laid out in the Article.  
One initial objection readers might raise is the potential 
classification of parents’ religious inculcation as an assimilation 
demand.28 Would adopting the assimilation demands frame-
work bar parents from passing on their beliefs about sexuality 
to their children or put them at risk of state intervention 
through FINS? While parents’ religious rights certainly deserve 
weighty consideration, the balance between those rights and 
children’s identity interest depends on the nature and severity 
of the family conflict. The test Part III offers—which distin-
guishes between assimilation demands and acceptable parent-
ing contingent on how coercive and harmful parents’ demands 
are—can limit intervention only to truly troubling cases. There 
are several examples in family law where fundamental rights 
that parents would hold as non-parents yield to children’s in-
terests: parents’ property rights take a back seat to their obli-
gation to financially support their children,29
 
 28. This concern might very well merit its own independent piece of 
scholarship and thus is out of the scope of this Article, which merely aims to 
start a conversation in the literature about assimilation demands in families. 
 and their exercise 
of the right to engage in non-marital relationships may cost 
 29. See, e.g., Dzierson v. Dzierson, 661 N.Y.S.2d 779, 781 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 
1997). 
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them custody rights.30 The case law on custody in interfaith 
families restricts parents’ rights to inculcate children in their 
religion when that religion has adverse effects on the child’s 
well-being.31 More importantly, the Supreme Court has put re-
strictions on parents’ religious rights when those implicate the 
child’s welfare and safety.32 With the wealth of empirical evi-
dence on the victimization of LGBT youth,33
I.  ASSIMILATION DEMANDS AT HOME: FROM A 
MELTING POT TO A PRESSURE COOKER   
 in instances of ex-
treme family conflict, parents’ religious rights should not take 
precedence over the child’s identity interests and well-being. In 
short, when a family is bitterly conflicted over the parents’ reli-
gion and the child’s sexual identity, it would be a FINS, which 
may ultimately present an opportunity for family repair. 
One goal of the parental rights paradigm, and the cases 
that establish it, is to prevent the assimilation of children into 
a monolithic American identity.34 But the result of this doctrine 
is the assimilation of children into their family and community 
identities, thereby restricting their independent identity inter-
ests.35
The ideal of assimilation—conforming to the mainstream—
is embodied in the metaphor of American society as a melting 
pot.
 To fully understand this point, and thus the need for a 
new legal framework that will protect children from parent’s 
assimilation demands, it is important to understand how co-
erced assimilation impacts identity, why LGBT youth are par-
ticularly vulnerable to assimilation demands, and whether 
children facing such demands have been able to find relief in 
court.  
36
 
 30. See Rosky, supra note 
 According to this metaphor, minorities are encouraged to 
20, at 283. 
 31. See, e.g., Sagar v. Sagar, 781 N.E.2d 54, 59 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) 
(finding that courts will generally maintain parents’ fundamental rights in 
free exercise of religion unless there is a compelling state interest—harm to 
the child); see also, e.g., Siegel v. Siegel, 472 N.Y.S.2d 272, 273 (N.Y. Spec. 
Term 1984); Munoz. v. Munoz, 489 P.2d 1133, 1134–35 (Wash. 1971). 
 32. E.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944). 
 33. See infra Part I.B. 
 34. Orly Rachel Rachmilovitz, Masters of Their Own Destiny: Children’s 
Identities, Parents’ Assimilation Demands and State Intervention 26–27 (May 
2012) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, University of Virginia School of Law) 
(on file with author).  
 35. Id. at 60–61. 
 36. YOSHINO, supra note 16, at x–xi. 
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assimilate into a neutral, American identity, which incorpo-
rates traits from different identity groups.37 Yoshino criticizes 
assimilation as costly to one’s authentic self—denying one’s 
freedom to develop an identity independent of pressures to con-
form.38 Thus, Yoshino distinguishes between assimilation that 
is necessary for citizenship, socialization, and peaceful social 
order, such as speaking a language or obeying the law, from as-
similation that is coerced by others and may be motivated by 
animus toward a particular group or identity category.39
Yoshino articulates three types of coerced assimilation, or 
assimilation demands: conversion, passing, and covering.
 
40 
Conversion is the demand to assimilate by changing unfavora-
ble identities or identity traits into more acceptable ones.41 
Passing is the demand to assimilate by concealing one’s unfa-
vorable identity and misleading others into believing that the 
individual identifies with the mainstream.42 Lastly, covering is 
the demand to assimilate by muting or downplaying the unfa-
vorable identity that one has made known to others.43 While 
conversion and passing target one’s status as a member of a 
minority group, covering is a demand that focuses on conduct 
that expresses a minority identity.44 Another aspect of covering, 
reverse-covering, is the demand that the individual perform ac-
cording to stereotypes associated with her identity group.45 It 
equally compromises one’s authentic identity and conduct. All 
assimilation demands are harmful to identity and to the au-
thentic self.46
 
 37. Id. at 140, 179.  
 Assimilation demands and their pressures con-
 38. Id. at 178. 
 39. Id. at 26–27. Yoshino gives examples of racial minorities required to 
“act white” due to white supremacy, women expected to downplay their family 
responsibilities at work because of patriarchy, and LGBT persons asked not to 
“flaunt” because of homophobia. Id. at xi. 
 40. Id. at 17–18. Erving Goffman describes how socially unfavorable 
groups navigate the performance of their “spoiled identities” to escape social 
burdens such as stigmatization and discrimination. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIG-
MA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITIES 42 (1962). 
 41. YOSHINO, supra note 16, at 46–47. 
 42. Id. at 17–18.  
 43. Id. at 18. 
 44. Id. at 22 (“[D]iscrimination directs itself not against the entire group, 
but against the subset of the group that fails to assimilate to mainstream 
norms. This new form of discrimination targets minority cultures rather than 
minority persons.”). 
 45. Id. at 23. Yoshino elaborates on reverse-covering with the example of 
women in the workplace. Id. at 143–52.  
 46. Lau, supra note 11, at 324. 
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flict with an individual’s sense-of-self, and her expression of 
that self, and undermine the consistency between the authentic 
self and the outwardly expressed self.47 Therefore, assimilation 
demands create psychological burdens, such as feelings of infe-
riority or self-hatred.48
Yoshino’s work illustrates the unique obstacles that minor-
ities face when confronting assimilation demands. He focuses 
extensively on the divide assimilation demands create within 
one’s sense-of-self—a dichotomy between the authentic, true 
self and a false self whose purpose is to mediate between the 
true self and the world.
 
49 When assimilation demands under-
mine or suppress an authentic identity, one cannot achieve full 
emotional health by appreciating and expressing one’s identity. 
Thus, assimilation demands compromise the process of identity 
development in the psychological sense—the development of 
understanding who we are, what we value, and where we are 
headed—by undermining the achievement of a coherent sense-
of-self.50
A. ASSIMILATION’S HARMS ON CHILDREN 
 
Assimilation demands on children are highly troubling, as 
multiple factors increase children’s vulnerability to such de-
mands. Factors such as children’s stage of identity and emo-
tional development, their attachment and dependence on fami-
ly, and the power structure within families leave children 
vulnerable to harmful assimilation demands at home. Assimi-
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 324–25.  
 49. YOSHINO, supra note 16, at 184–85 (presenting D.W. Winnicott’s theo-
ry regarding true and false selves and the relationship between them as 
measures of psychological health). Both Winnicott’s work and Yoshino’s use of 
this dichotomy have been criticized by legal scholars. Paul Horwitz suggested 
that “[t]here is reason to be skeptical of Winnicott’s simple schema of the true 
and false selves . . . . [T]hese vague and amorphous terms . . . are not much 
help in identifying precisely what, if anything, the True Self means.” Paul 
Horwitz, Uncovering Identity, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1283, 1289 (2007) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (book review). Marc Poirier questions Yoshino’s as-
sertion that authenticity is a universal goal, and therefore assimilation is a 
universal harm. Marc R. Poirier, Microperformances of Identity: Visible Same-
Sex Couples and the Marriage Controversy, 15 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & 
SOC. JUST. 3, 37–39 (2008). I mention Winnicott’s theory here because it is the 
psychological foundation for Yoshino’s argument. However, I make better use 
of Erik Erikson’s analysis of harms to identity because of identity foreclosure, 
confusion, and assimilation demands’ general challenge to identity achieve-
ment and intimacy. See infra Part I.A. 
 50. See PATTERSON, supra note 11, at 543–44. 
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lation demands at home are compounded by the high level of 
control parents have on children’s environment and interac-
tions outside the family. Parents can control which schools 
children attend51 as well as children’s associations outside of 
school and the home.52
Though Yoshino couches his arguments about assimila-
tion’s harms to identity in the idea of the authentic self,
 Thus, parents have extensive power and 
oversight over the community to which children belong and the 
values and norms to which they are exposed, making children 
more dependent on protection from sources outside their fami-
lies and immediate communities, such as the legal system. To 
conclude that assimilation’s harms should be mitigated by the 
law first requires the examination of the premise that children 
are in fact harmed, and severely so, by assimilation demands. 
The extreme level and quality of harm children suffer warrants 
the state intervention I advocate. 
53 the 
work of psychologist and identity theorist Erik Erikson adds to 
the understanding of assimilation’s harms to identity, and par-
ticularly children’s identity development. Erikson suggested 
that experimentation is pivotal to a healthy identity.54 Explor-
ing different talents and skills facilitates industry in place of 
inferiority.55 Beyond belonging to a social group, one’s identity 
is also a result of one’s interests and capabilities.56 If one is un-
able to develop her identity through exploration, she is at risk 
of identity confusion or foreclosure and the resulting harms: 
“Youth after youth, bewildered by the incapacity to assume a 
role forced on him by the inexorable standardization of Ameri-
can adolescence, runs away in one form or another, dropping 
out of school, leaving jobs, staying out all night, or withdrawing 
into bizarre and inaccessible moods.”57
 
 51. Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names, 268 U.S. 510, 534 
(1925); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402–03 (1923) (holding that 
parents have the right to choose their children’s lingual and cultural educa-
tion).  
 Thus, exploration helps 
achieve a coherent and stable identity and is necessary for 
adults to enjoy higher levels of mental health. Healthy identity 
 52. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66–69 (2000). 
 53. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text. 
 54. See infra notes 57–61 and accompanying text. 
 55. ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS 123–25 (1968). 
 56. Id. at 124–25. 
 57. Id. at 132.  
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achievement is further crucial for accomplishing what Erikson 
viewed as true intimacy—the merging of identities.58
Erikson touches on what are, in effect, assimilation de-
mands on youth’s identities.
  
59 While adolescents struggle to 
forge a coherent identity that is natural and authentic to them, 
outside pressures to assimilate into an expected, more desirable 
identity may result in a range of harms.60 Assimilation de-
mands threaten identity achievement because they discourage 
the exploration and experimentation necessary for committing 
to an authentic identity.61 Without exploration of the authentic 
self, identity foreclosure occurs, and with it comes the inability 
to accomplish intimacy as well as an overall weakened emo-
tional health.62
Though under Yoshino and Erikson’s theories we are all 
harmed by assimilation demands that foreclose our identity ex-
ploration and compromise our healthy identity development or 
stable identity once identity formation is achieved, children are 
especially vulnerable to assimilation demands because of their 
incomplete development.
  
63 A legal framework that aspires to 
end assimilation demands must deflect the particular and ex-
acerbated harm assimilation demands create for children. 
Though Yoshino makes a compelling case for protecting adults 
from assimilation demands that violate their civil rights,64 the 
case for children’s protection faces unique challenges. The fact 
that harms to children are different and worse than harms to 
adults may not, alone, be persuasive enough to overcome the 
parental rights paradigm or family privacy policies. However, 
parental rights do not justify a blanket rule against protection, 
but rather require the development of more refined legal tools 
that can identify the cases where protection is needed, and the 
form that said protection should take.65
 
 58. Id. at 135. Erikson focuses on “a true and mutual psychological inti-
macy with another person,” rather than sexual intimacy. See PATTERSON, su-
pra note 
 Illustrated below are 
two reasons for legal intervention to protect children from as-
11, at 544. 
 59. See ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 131–32 (1964) (de-
scribing attempts to assimilate Sioux children and the resulting difficulties for 
those children to form either Indian or American identities). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id.  
 62. See ERIKSON, supra note 55, at 135. 
 63. See infra Part I.A. 
 64. See YOSHINO, supra note 16, at 173–83. 
 65. See infra Parts I.C.2., II. 
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similation demands despite the parental rights paradigm: en-
suring children’s optimal development, and compensating for 
imbalanced family dynamics. This Article focuses on the dis-
tinct experience of LGBT youth, the current availability of legal 
protections for children’s identity interests and autonomy, and 
the inadequacy of these and other existing frameworks, such as 
abuse or neglect law, to fully guarantee children are safe from 
assimilation demands in the home. 
1. Children’s Optimal Development 
The distinct and elevated harms children’s identities suffer 
when subject to assimilation demands are a result of their de-
velopmental stage.66 Children are particularly prone to assimi-
lation demands that impose identities that may not ring true.67 
Since children have yet to fully develop coping skills and lack 
the resources that allow them to handle assimilation demands 
and their harms,68 the law should take it upon itself to compen-
sate for children’s inability to deflect harmful assimilation de-
mands. Yoshino’s concern about assimilation demands restrict-
ing opportunities for exploration and experimentation with 
identity and authenticity is perhaps most relevant to children.69
Because children’s identity has not yet formed, adults con-
sider them sexual waverers who must be protected from devel-
oping an unfavorable identity and converted to comply with ex-
pectations of what their identity should be.
  
70 Accordingly, 
parents may wish to indoctrinate or expose children only to 
values and goals that parents see as appropriate. Presented 
with imminent failure, some parents utilize aggressive tactics 
in the context of sexuality, such as conversion therapy, which 
attempts to change same-sex sexual orientation or gender non-
conformity “back” to heterosexuality or gender conformity.71
 
 66. Lau,  supra note 
 
That children are most vulnerable to assimilation demands in 
11, at 327; see also Mary Jane Rotheram-Borus & 
Kris A. Langabeer, Developmental Trajectories of Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual 
Youth, in LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL IDENTITIES AND YOUTH 97, 105 
(D’Augelli & Patterson eds., 2001). 
 67. See Lau, supra note 11, at 333.  
 68. Id. at 327–29. 
 69. See YOSHINO, supra note 16, at 17–21. 
 70. Id. at 44.  
 71. Because I am more interested in the less overt forms assimilation de-
mands take, I do not explore conversion therapy here. Conversion therapy, its 
futility, and harms have received vast attention from scholars, including 
Yoshino. See infra note 139 and accompanying text. 
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their most severe form (conversion) and from the most coercive 
and harm-inflicting source (the family) establishes the need to 
better protect children from conversion, as well as other forms 
of assimilation demands.  
Conformity to assimilation demands cause children and 
youth to abandon their sense-of-self and commit to goals and 
values they are expected to adopt, even when these are incon-
sistent with their identity.72 As teens struggle with developing 
their identity, assimilation demands jeopardize a strong sense-
of-self and psychological health, resulting in a young person’s 
reduced productivity, depression, and difficulty forming and 
sustaining intimate relationships.73 Other unfortunate conse-
quences of victimization74 are high rates of suicidality,75 sub-
stance abuse,76 and homelessness due to either running away 
from home or being cast out by parents.77 Faced with assimila-
tion demands, children realize they cannot depend on parents, 
friends, or other close contacts for support in their identity ex-
plorations.78
2. Imbalanced Family Dynamics 
 
Warm and attentive relationships with parents foster 
trust, a sense of safety, and high levels of self-esteem while al-
lowing for exploration without shame or self-doubt.79
 
 72. Lau, supra note 
 According 
to attachment theory, the close interactions between a child 
11, at 332. 
 73. Id. at 329–30. 
 74. I use “victimization” as an umbrella term for abuse, neglect, harass-
ment, discrimination, or other forms of mistreatment youth experience, 
whether at school, home, or other spaces. 
 75. Rotheram-Borus & Langabeer, supra note 66, at 111–13; see also Cait-
lin Ryan et al., Family Rejection as a Predictor of Negative Health Outcomes in 
White and Latino Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Young Adults, 123 PEDIATRICS 
346, 349 (2009) (presenting data regarding depression, suicidality and the link 
between them). Additional studies show that youth at the intersection of sexu-
al orientation and race/ethnicity are at even greater risk for depression and 
suicidality.  
 76. Rotheram-Borus & Langabeer, supra note 66, at 113–15. 
 77. PATTERSON, supra note 11, at 491–92; see also Rotheram-Borus & 
Langabeer, supra note 66, at 104 (reporting high rates of negative reactions 
from parents upon children’s disclosure of same-sex sexual orientation, includ-
ing high rates of children being expelled from home after coming out). 
 78. Rotheram-Borus & Langabeer, supra note 66, at 105. 
 79. ERIKSON, supra note 59, at 249, 252–55 (defining shame as self-
consciousness and warning about shame turning into self-rage and self-hatred 
causing the child—and later, the adult—to rid herself of that within herself 
which causes such shame). 
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and parent help them to form emotional bonds essential to the 
child’s survival.80 Attachments ensure that parents care for 
their children and keep them safe.81 Indeed, the parental rights 
paradigm reflects the law’s support for healthy attachment 
bonds (termed “secure attachment”) between parents and their 
children. Yet, not all attachment patterns are alike. Types of 
attachment vary in degree of protection and comfort parents 
provide, as well as in the child’s resulting happiness and confi-
dence.82 Secure attachment is the most common and healthy 
type of attachment.83 It is characterized by the child’s sense of 
security84 and the ability to create well-balanced relationships 
with others in ways that foster both autonomy and closeness.85 
Other types of attachments are generally categorized as inse-
cure attachments. In these attachment patterns, a child learns 
that parents are unresponsive or unable to fulfill her needs.86 
Because insecure attachments implicate the ability to accurate-
ly understand relationships and conduct them appropriately, 
they cause social skills and functioning to deteriorate in the 
long run,87 as well as negative expectations regarding others, 
distorted communication patterns,88 or otherwise hostile inter-
actions.89
While attachment styles are usually stable throughout life, 
stressful events such as conflicts around a child’s independent 
 
 
 80. See Mary D. Salter Ainsworth, Infant Mother Attachment, 34 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 932, 936 (1979). 
 81. PATTERSON, supra note 11, at 228. 
 82. See R. Chris Fraley, A Brief Overview of Adult Attachment Theory and 
Research, U. ILL. (2010), http://internal.psychology.illinois.edu/~rcfraley/ 
attachment.htm. 
 83. Id. 
 84. PATTERSON, supra note 11, at 230.  
 85. Joseph P. Allen et al., The Relation of Attachment Security to Adoles-
cents’ Parental and Peer Relationships, Depression, and Externalizing Behav-
ior, 78 CHILD DEV. 1222, 1235 (2007); Robert J. Waldinger et al., Attachment 
and Core Relationship Themes: Wishes for Autonomy and Closeness in the 
Narratives of Securely and Insecurely Attached Adults, 13 PSYCHOTHERAPY 
RES. 77, 79 (2003). 
 86. PATTERSON, supra note 11, at 232.  
 87. Joseph P. Allen et al., Attachment and Autonomy as Predictors of the 
Development of Social Skills and Delinquency During Midadolescence, 70 J. 
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 56, 63 (2002). 
 88. Allen et al., supra note 85, at 1223. 
 89. Joseph P. Allen et al., Prediction of Peer-Rated Adult Hostility from 
Autonomy Struggles in Adolescent-Family Interactions, 14 DEV. & PSYCHO-
PATHOLOGY 123, 133 (2002). 
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identity may impact security.90
The concern here is twofold. The direct result of assimila-
tion demands and the coinciding decrease in attachments could 
lead children to engage in at-risk behavior.
 When parents do not support 
the child during conflicts and instead impose assimilation de-
mands, attachment suffers. Assimilation demands put a strain 
on relationships because they are a form of rejection. The loss 
of trust and intimacy caused by the erosion of attachments 
render children less free to explore their identity and exercise 
their autonomy.  
91 An indirect result 
is that children become less capable of coping well with assimi-
lation demands. Attachments that become insecure exacerbate 
families’ imbalanced power structures.92
Family power dynamics already disadvantage children. 
Children are dependent on parents emotionally, physically, and 
financially, as well as in other ways. A minority identity that 
parents may not share can further disadvantage children in 
families by adding a power struggle between minority and 
mainstream identities to the parent-child relationship. But 
even when family dynamics are not abusive per se, the child 
might find that the loss of trust and intimacy in her relation-
ships with her parents hinder her healthy development or her 
 This leaves children 
more isolated within the family, suffering from weakened emo-
tional health, and more likely to be mistreated by family mem-
bers (or less likely to be resilient in the face of mistreatment). 
 
 90. Stressful life events that impact security include: illness, divorce, in-
carceration, addiction, a deterioration in parenting skills due to parental men-
tal health concerns, adolescents own mental health, and struggles between 
adolescents and parents about the child’s need for autonomy on the one hand 
and her continued need for support. PATTERSON, supra note 11, at 232–33, 
336; Joseph P. Allen et al., Stability and Change in Attachment Security 
Across Adolescence, 75 CHILD DEV. 1792, 1793–94, 1802 (2004); Allen et al., 
supra note 85, at 1223. 
 91. Social scientists have linked insecure attachments and hostile family 
conflicts to teenage delinquency, drug use, depression, anxiety, unsafe sexual 
practices, and poor academic achievement. Joseph P. Allen et al., The Connec-
tion of Observed Hostile Family Conflict to Adolescents’ Developing Autonomy 
and Relatedness with Parents, 8 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 425, 425–26 
(1996) [hereinafter Allen et al., Conflicts in Families] (explaining that in ex-
treme situations where a relationship does not satisfy parties’ needs, hostile 
conflicts may ensue); Joseph P. Allen et al., Adolescent Problem Behavior: The 
Influence of Attachment and Autonomy, 13 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 455, 
456 (1990) [hereinafter Allen et al., Adolescent Problem Behavior]. 
 92. On imbalanced relationships, loss of trust, and their contribution to 
maltreatment and abuse of weaker parties, see generally Orly Rachmilovitz, 
Bringing Down the Bedroom Walls: Emphasizing Substance over Form in Per-
sonalized Abuse, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 495, 502–05 (2008). 
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ability to challenge assimilation demands. In the adult context, 
Yoshino’s work supports social solutions in the form of reason-
forcing conversations,93 but this is unhelpful to children. Social 
change that is dependent exclusively on conversations initiated 
by the subject of the demand puts additional burdens on disad-
vantaged parties. Requiring children to do this work, without 
the assistance of legal or social institutions, further cements 
the imbalance between children and parents. Because such so-
lutions burden the less powerful party, they may prove impos-
sible for children confronting parents’ assimilation demands.94
A healthy identity depends on supportive social networks.
  
95 
Indeed, warm and close relationships with parents help miti-
gate other stressors that teens may experience growing up.96 
Yet positive parent-child relationships often suffer when chil-
dren exhibit identities that are objectionable to parents.97 Par-
ents who impose assimilation demands create a stressful, un-
supportive environment, increasing the likelihood that 
adolescents will engage in unhealthy conduct.98
 
 93. Yoshino warns that the law cannot be the ultimate solution for assimi-
lation demands. Where the law’s work ends, he claims, society must step in. 
Personal connections and reason-forcing conversations in which people con-
front each other and their demands of assimilation will facilitate compassion 
and understanding about the harm of assimilation demands. This in turn will 
lead to the abandonment of such demands. YOSHINO, supra note 
 Because the 
family is the most significant and most immediate social net-
work, hostility in the home increases the risk of identity fore-
closure and is therefore most detrimental to identity achieve-
16, at 24. 
Such reason-forcing conversations would allow the subject of the demands to 
challenge the motivation behind the demand and its legitimacy. Yoshino fore-
sees the result of these conversations to be a middle ground between assimila-
tion and authenticity that he doubts the law can reach alone. Id. at 193–95. 
 94. See infra Part II. 
 95. Lau, supra note 11, at 328–29. 
 96. PATTERSON, supra note 11, at 566; see also Ryan et al., supra note 75, 
at 349–50 (finding that stressors from family because of sexual identity exac-
erbate unrelated negative health outcomes). 
 97. Julia A. Graber & Andrea Bastiani Archibald, Psychosocial Change at 
Puberty and Beyond: Understanding Adolescent Sexuality and Sexual Orienta-
tion, in LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL IDENTITIES AND YOUTH, supra note 66, 
at 3, 11 (“Given the Polarization of the reality of the adolescent’s world and 
parental beliefs and expectations [regarding the adolescent’s sexual identity], 
parent-adolescent relationships may involve significant change.”). 
 98. See Ryan et al., supra note 75, at 350 (based on data that suicide rates 
increase after coming out to parents, arguing that children’s dependency on 
parents worsens severity of consequences and stressors related to coming out 
to parents); see also Graber & Archibald, supra note 97, at 13 (describing neg-
ative responses from parents after learning of their children’s sexual identity). 
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ment and a healthy sense-of-self. This makes coping with as-
similation demands from parents all the more challenging to 
children and adolescents. If assimilation demands imposed by 
mainstream society on adults are likened to a melting pot, then 
assimilation demands imposed by parents on children can be 
analogized to a pressure cooker. 
B. ASSIMILATION’S HARMS ON LGBT YOUTH  
While Yoshino centers his theory primarily on sexual mi-
norities because he believes some assimilation demands apply 
to this group more than others, I concentrate on sexual minori-
ty youth because they are more vulnerable to assimilation de-
mands by parents than other groups are. Unfortunately, many 
sexual minority children are not raised in supportive families 
who stand by them regardless of their sexual orientation or 
gender identity.99 So far the law, both in academia and in prac-
tice, has mainly been concerned with the struggles LGBT youth 
face in the public sphere—in public education, foster care, or 
the juvenile system.100 LGBT youth are overrepresented among 
at-risk youth but are under-protected by the legal system, 
which suggests that the crisis of LGBT youth extends beyond 
the public sphere. Presumably, children who grow up in sup-
portive and caring households are less likely to experience the 
hardships and rejection that lead to their victimization outside 
of the home, or are more likely to lean on parents for protection 
when victimization occurs. This is not to say that other children 
are not victimized by parents, or that parents do not victimize 
their children based on other diverging identities related to 
race or religion. Yet the empirical data presented below strong-
ly supports the notion that LGBT youth are more commonly, 
more uniquely, and more aggressively victimized by their fami-
lies.101
 
 99. See Ryan et al., supra note 
 The data also suggest that LGBT youth have less access 
75, at 350–51. 
 100. For legal scholarship discussing the rights of LGBT youth in the pub-
lic education system, see generally STUART BIEGEL, THE RIGHT TO BE OUT: 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
23–46 (2010); Lau, supra note 11. Many non-profit organizations have directed 
their efforts to LGBT youth issues, including the Gay, Lesbian and Straight 
Education Network, the Gay Straight Alliance Network (both dedicated to is-
sues at school), and Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund's youth pro-
ject (focusing both on schools and out-of-home care).  
 101. See infra Part I.C.; see also supra notes 77–86 and accompanying text 
(citing studies revealing similar trends).  
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to legal recourse.102 These studies are consistent with studies 
finding that LGBT status, stigmatization, and discrimination 
cause negative mental health outcomes in adults.103
A parent’s response to a child’s disclosure of an LGBT iden-
tity impacts the parent-child relationship, as well as the child’s 
healthy development.
 
104 Social science research identifies a va-
riety of increased negative outcomes and risks for LGBT youth 
and ties those outcomes to troubled relationships with parents 
and other family members. A study conducted by the San Fran-
cisco State University Family Acceptance Project (FAP) found 
marked differences in the physical and mental health outcomes 
of LGBT youth who have experienced high, moderate, or low 
levels of family rejection.105 FAP defines rejecting behaviors by 
families as behavior designed to change a child’s sexual identi-
ty, convey messages that gender nonconformity or same-sex 
orientation is shameful, sinful, or otherwise devalued, or isolate 
a child from LGBT associations or resources.106 Low-rejection 
families exhibit only few, or none, of these behaviors, while 
moderate-rejection families exhibit some negative behaviors, 
but also express some positive reactions to a child’s sexual 
identity.107
 
 102. See infra Part I.C. 
 Lastly, high-rejection families are those who exhibit 
extremely negative behaviors and express their disappointment 
 103. Ilan H. Meyer, Prejudice and Discrimination as Social Stressors, in 
THE HEALTH OF SEXUAL MINORITIES: PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVES ON LES-
BIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER POPULATIONS 242–67 (Ilan H. Meyer 
& M.E. Northridge eds., 2007) (describing the nature and effect of discrimina-
tion and stigma on the LGBT community).  
 104. See LAMBDA LEGAL & CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, FAMILIES 
SUPPORTING AN LGBTQ CHILD (2006), available at http://data.lambdalegal 
.org/publications/downloads/gdtb_families-supporting-an-lgbtq-child.pdf (rec-
ommending healthy responses for parents learning their child’s sexual minori-
ty identity). 
 105. See Ryan et al., supra note 75, at 349–50.  
 106. CAITLIN RYAN ET AL., SUPPORTIVE FAMILIES, HEALTHY CHILDREN: 
HELPING FAMILIES WITH LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER CHIL-
DREN 6, 8 (2009), available at http://familyproject.sfsu.edu/files/English_Final_ 
Print_Version_Last.pdf. This publication provides additional examples of re-
jecting behaviors and recommends parents avoid them, including: physical vio-
lence, verbal harassment or name-calling, excluding from family activities, 
blocking access to friends or resources, blaming the child for her mistreat-
ment, pressuring the child to present consistently with heterosexuality or the 
sex assigned at birth, saying God will punish the child for her sexual identity, 
telling a child she is a source of shame to the family. Id. at 8. 
 107. Id. 
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or shame, sometimes by attempting to change a child’s identi-
ty.108
The FAP studies show significant disparities for health 
outcomes between LGBT youth from low-, moderate-, or high-
rejection families.
 
109 For example, 19.7% of LGBT youth in low-
rejection families have attempted suicide, compared to 35.1% in 
moderate-rejection families and 67.6% of LGBT youth in high-
rejection families.110 Depression rates reflect similar disparities: 
22.4% of LGBT youth in low-rejection families reported suffer-
ing from depression, with 44.6% of LGBT youth in moderate-
rejection families and 63.5% of LGBT youth in high-rejection 
families reporting the same.111 While only a marginal difference 
exists in rates of substance abuse112 between LGBT youth from 
low-rejection and moderate-rejection families—48% and 47.3%, 
respectively—there is a considerable increase in substance 
abuse for LGBT youth in high-rejection families, where the rate 
of substance abuse climbs to 68.9%.113 Lastly, this study found 
LGBT youth in high-rejection families had an increased risk of 
engaging in unprotected sexual activity with casual partners 
within the six months prior to the study; 23.7% of LGBT youth 
from low-rejection families reported having such unprotected 
sex, with 12.2% of LGBT youth from moderate-rejection fami-
lies and 45.9% of LGBT youth from high-rejection families re-
porting such unprotected sexual encounters.114
A National Gay and Lesbian Task Force report compiled 
statistics about LGBT homeless youth that tell a similar story 
about the grave results of family rejection.
 Therefore, the 
quantity and quality of family rejection that youth experience 
significantly compromise their emotional health and endanger 
their physical well-being. 
115 Between 20 and 
40% of American homeless youth identified as LGBT.116
 
 108. See id. at 6.  
 Twen-
 109. Ryan et al., supra note 75, at 350. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Defined by FAP as the abuse of any substance at any point in time 
throughout life. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. NICHOLAS RAY, NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, LESBIAN, 
GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH: AN EPIDEMIC OF HOMELESSNESS 2 
(2006), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/HomelessYouth 
.pdf. 
 116. Id. at 13. 
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ty-six percent of these teens were forced to leave home upon 
disclosure of their sexual identity to their families.117 Others 
chose to leave home after experiencing other forms of rejection. 
Studies estimate that half of all gay male youth experienced 
some form of negative reaction from their families,118 and as 
much as one-third of all LGBT homeless youth suffered physi-
cal violence, including sexual assault from family members.119 
The report also explains some of the reasons why homeless 
LGBT youth remain homeless. Family rejection coupled with 
school-based mistreatment leads to a lack of educational oppor-
tunities, and thus lower income potential.120 The experience of 
homophobia inspires romanticized ideas of living in more toler-
ant communities, usually urban environments.121 For this rea-
son, LGBT youth tend to leave their hometowns for cities like 
New York, Los Angeles, and San Francisco,122 where affordable 
housing is scarce.123 The difficulty in securing employment that 
pays a livable wage often prohibits LGBT youth from escaping 
homelessness.124 Moreover, in an attempt to drive the homeless, 
including homeless youth, out of public view and spaces, city 
ordinances and state laws criminalize survival-focused activity 
associated with homelessness, such as theft, drug use, drug 
possession and dealing, and sex work.125 These studies on the 
state of LGBT youth126
But what is it about sexual orientation or gender identity 
that makes LGBT youth so vulnerable to harmful home envi-
ronments? Sexual orientation and gender identity, as identity 
categories, are independent of the sexual orientation or gender 
 reflect the pervasive and egregious con-
sequences that LGBT youth suffer because of family rejection 
and illustrate the urgency of systemic change to end the disem-
powerment and vulnerability of LGBT youth. 
 
 117. Id. at 16. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at 18. 
 120. Id. at 20–22. 
 121. Luke A. Boso, Urban Bias, Rural Sexual Minorities and the Courts, 60 
UCLA L. REV. 562, 576–78 (2013). 
 122. Id. 
 123. RAY, supra note 115, at 22. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Cf. id. at 59, 71. 
 126. For a study on the vulnerability of LGBT youth for over-involvement 
in and higher penalties from the juvenile system, see Kathryn Himmelstein & 
Hannah Brückner, Criminal-Justice and School Sanctions Against 
Nonheterosexual Youth: A National Longitudinal Study, 127 PEDIATRICS 49, 
52 (2011). 
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identity of family members.127 As opposed to racial minority 
youth, whose family members usually share their racial identi-
ty and can therefore provide guidance, support, and encour-
agement during the stages of identity development,128 LGBT 
youth usually have no such inherent support system.129 LGBT 
youth are faced with exploring, forming, disclosing, and per-
forming their sexual identity without assistance, and often with 
hostility, from parents.130
Heteronormative culture translates into LGBT youth often 
suffering through the most extreme type of assimilation de-
mands, which in turn renders them prone to the most severe 
harms. American society and its legal system tend to be uncom-
fortable with the sexuality of children and youth, and particu-
larly with the prospect of young people developing sexual mi-
nority identities.
 This makes these youth extremely 
prone to assimilation demands from parents, whereas other 
teens are able to make sense of their identities with parents 
serving as role models.  
131 This “moral panic”132
 
 127. See William R. Rice et al., Homosexuality as a Consequence of Epige-
netically Canalized Sexual Development, 87 Q.R. BIOLOGY 343, 344 (2012) (ar-
guing that sexual orientation is a result of the interaction between DNA  and 
environmental factors and thus is only partially hereditary); see also George 
Dvorsky, Scientists Claim that Homosexuality Is Not Genetic—But It Arises in 
the Womb, IO9.COM (Dec. 11, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://io9.com/5967426/scientists 
-confirm-that-homosexuality-is-not-genetic--but-it-arises-in-the 
-womb (explaining the findings of the Rice study). 
 guides courts deciding 
 128. See David H. Demo & Michael Hughes, Socialization and Racial Iden-
tity Among Black Americans, 53 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 364, 372 (1990) (concluding 
that the study “substantiate[d] the important role of black families in provid-
ing social support and familial bonds”); Nancy Tenney, The Constitutional Im-
perative of Reality in Public Schools Curricula: Untruths About Homosexuality 
as a Violation of the First Amendment, 60 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1599, 1611 
(1995) (“Many families that are members of racial or ethnic minorities prepare 
their children for the harassment they may face in the world and provide sup-
port when their children encounter oppressive treatment.”). 
 129. BIEGEL, supra note 100, at 124 (“[A]n LGBT identity often emerges 
quietly and secretly within a young person. It may be the case that the young 
person has no one to turn to—no friends to talk with about it, no family or 
community members to open up to.”). 
 130. See RAY, supra note 115, at 16. 
 131. See Rosky, supra note 20, at 294–97 (describing cases that have de-
nied custody or visitation to gay and lesbian parents based partially on the 
stereotype that LGBT parents encourage same-sex sexual orientation in their 
children). 
 132. See MORAL PANIC, SEX PANICS: FEAR AND THE FIGHT OVER SEXUAL 
RIGHTS (Gilbert Herdt ed., 2009). Moral panic involves “large social events oc-
curring in troubled times when a serious threat by evil-doers incites societal 
reaction.” Id. at 5. 
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custody disputes involving lesbian or gay parents,133 informs 
education policies such as “No Promo Homo” laws,134 and ulti-
mately motivates parents’ mistreatment of non-heteronorm-
ative children, whether they identify as LGBT or not.135
Although all children may be vulnerable to assimilation 
demands, sexual minority children are at higher risk because 
they are left to develop their sexual orientation or gender iden-
tity without parental support (and also often without communi-
ty support).
 
136 Moreover, developing and asserting sexual mi-
nority identities can come at a higher cost to emotional health 
due to stigmatization—whether internalized or from outside 
sources—and pursuant isolation.137
Sexual minority youth may find themselves required to de-
fend their sexual identities. To the extent that same-sex sexual 
orientation or gender nonconforming identities are acceptable 
for adults, these identities should be respected as valid for 
youth, as well. Presumably, LGBT adults used to be LGBT 
youth. Assimilation demands designed to prevent or mitigate 
same-sex sexual orientation or gender nonconformity in youth 
reflect and are motivated by animus and should be considered 
as unacceptable as assimilation demands on adults. Still, one 
could argue that, though these identities are value-neutral for 
adults, it is important to prevent or mitigate them in children 
because avoiding early queer identities might reduce the dis-
crimination or harassment children would grow to encounter as 
adults. This argument is unpersuasive. If LGBT identities were 
truly value-neutral, as they should be, these potential rights in-
fringements (themselves assimilation demands) should not be a 
concern—they would no longer exist as acceptable or tolerated 
behavior toward sexual minorities.
 
138
 
 133. See YOSHINO, supra note 
 
16, at 101–03; Rosky, supra note 20, at 294–
97. 
 134. “No Promo Homo” laws include policies and laws prohibiting positive 
discussion of homosexuality in school programs and curricula, or any such dis-
cussion at all. William Eskridge, No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of An-
tigay Discourse and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1327, 1329, 1359–60 (2000). 
 135. See, e.g., In re Shane T., 453 N.Y.S.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982) 
(noting father’s testimony that he verbally abused his son to “cure the child of 
certain unspecified ‘girlie’ behavior”). 
 136. YOSHINO, supra note 16, at 184. 
 137. See RAY, supra note 115, at 2. 
 138. For more on this point, see Clifford Rosky, Fear of the Queer Child, 61 
BUFF. L. REV. 607 (2013). Rosky shows how social anxiety around children’s 
non-conforming sexual identity has informed law and policy around children’s 
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C. ASSIMILATION DEMANDS IN COURTS: ARE ASSIMILATION 
DEMANDS A PARENTAL RIGHT?  
Harsh assimilation demands are not a phenomenon exclu-
sive to the public sphere. The private sphere—homes and fami-
lies—imposes heterosexuality on children through tactics that 
are even more hostile to children’s sexual diversity, sometimes 
even violently so. This part of the Article provides examples 
from court cases to illustrate the assimilation demands parents 
impose on children to try to force their sexual orientation or 
gender identity to conform to mainstream standards. At the ex-
treme, parents subject children to abusive and harmful practic-
es such as conversion therapy, the practice of providing coun-
seling with the intention to “cure” one’s homosexuality.139
 
sexuality and education. He challenges the LGBT movement to tackle this fear 
head on, stating that so far the movement’s strategies distanced its goals from 
their links to children, essentially claiming LGBT rights did not foster queer-
ness in children. To Rosky, such responses are  
 
defensive; worse still, [they are] apologetic. [They] attack[] the factual 
premise that queerness can be contained, but [they] fail[] to challenge 
the normative premise that queerness should be contained . . . . [The-
se] response[s] amount[] to an assurance that queerness is not conta-
gious, rather than an assertion of an individual’s equal liberty to be 
queer or straight. Even if only for the purpose of argument, [they] en-
tertain[] the troubling assumption that queerness is immoral, harm-
ful, or inferior, and thus that the state may legitimately discourage 
children from being or becoming queer. 
Id. at 609–10. 
 139. Conversion therapy (also known as “reparative therapy” or “ex-gay 
therapy”) attempts to eliminate one’s same-sex sexual orientation through 
counseling, and is generally practiced by religious groups. JUST THE FACTS 
COAL., JUST THE FACTS ABOUT SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND YOUTH: A PRIMER 
FOR PRINCIPALS, EDUCATORS, AND SCHOOL PERSONNEL 2, 5 (2008), available 
at http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/just-the-facts.pdf. The American Psy-
chological Association rejects conversion therapy: “[S]uch efforts have serious 
potential to harm young people because they present the view that the sexual 
orientation of lesbian, gay, and bisexual youth is a mental illness or disorder, 
and they often frame the inability to change one’s sexual orientation as a per-
sonal and moral failure.” Id. at 5. The American Psychiatric Association also 
condemns the practice:  
In the last four decades, [conversion] therapists have not produced 
any rigorous scientific research to substantiate their claims of cure 
. . . . The potential risks of reparative therapy are great, including de-
pression, anxiety and self-destructive behavior, since therapist 
alignment with societal prejudices against homosexuality may rein-
force self-hatred already experienced by the patient. Many patients 
who have undergone reparative therapy relate that they were inaccu-
rately told that homosexuals are lonely, unhappy individuals who 
never achieve acceptance or satisfaction.  
Id. at 6. For more detailed discussion of conversion therapy, including the idea 
that conversion therapy might constitute child abuse, see John Alan Cohan, 
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Slightly less aggressively, parents try to control their children’s 
sexual identity through abuse or neglect, even if the child does 
not identify as LGBT,140 by referring to the child in derogatory 
terms or berating behavior in an attempt to “correct” gender 
presentation,141 or severing ties because of the child’s sexual 
identity.142 Seemingly less abusive demands may manifest 
themselves in conflicts where the child is not technically a par-
ty, such as custody disputes143 or litigation involving the child’s 
intimate partner.144 These cases have mixed results, and some 
protect children better than others. However, all these courts 
understand that the parents’ behavior is harmful to children, 
and some go as far as explicitly positioning that behavior out-
side of parental rights.145 Others find children’s identity inter-
ests to be encompassed in the fundamental right to privacy, 
thus establishing that children’s sexual identity is as salient in 
children as in adults and therefore warrants legal protection.146
 
Parental Duties and the Right of Homosexual Minors to Refuse “Reparative” 
Therapy, 11 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 67 (2002); David B. Cruz, Controlling De-
sires: Sexual Orientation Conversion and the Limits of Knowledge and Law, 72 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1297 (1999); Laura A. Gans, Inverts, Perverts, and Converts: 
Sexual Orientation Conversion Therapy and Liability, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 
219 (1999); Karolyn Ann Hicks, “Reparative” Therapy: Whether Parental At-
tempts to Change a Child’s Sexual Orientation Can Legally Constitute Child 
Abuse, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 505 (1999); Sonia Renee Martin, Note, A Child’s 
Right to Be Gay: Addressing the Emotional Maltreatment of Queer Youth, 48 
HASTINGS L.J. 167, 174 (1996); Tyler Talbot, Comment, Reparative Therapy 
for Homosexual Teens: The Choice of the Teen Should Be the Only Choice Dis-
cussed, 27 J. JUV. L. 33 (2006); Sean Young, Note, Does “Reparative” Therapy 
Really Constitute Child Abuse?: A Closer Look, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & 
ETHICS 163 (2006). 
 
 140. See Shane T., 453 N.Y.S.2d at 593; infra Part II.A. 
 141. C.O. v. B.C., No. B206425, 2008 WL 4670513, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 
23, 2008);  Zion J. v. Lillie J., No. A111895, 2006 WL 2709831, at *1 (Cal. App. 
Sept. 22, 2006); Shane T., 453 N.Y.S.2d at 592–93; Catherine W. v. Robert F., 
455 N.Y.S. 2d 519, 521 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982). 
 142. Dzierson v. Dzierson, 661 N.Y.S.2d 779, 780 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1997). 
 143. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, No. 05 JE 42, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 1282 
(Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2007) (involving the custody of a gender non-conforming 
child). In custody cases, the child is not formally a party. Instead, the state as-
sumes the representation of the child’s interests. E.g., Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 
187, 193 (1962). Still, the conflict at the root of these types of litigation is be-
tween the child and parent. See Smith, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 1282, at *1–2 
(relating father’s motion for reallocation of parental rights due to mother’s 
support for the child’s gender non-conformity). 
 144. See Acevedo v. Williams, 985 So. 2d 669 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (in-
volving mother’s petition for a restraining order against her daughter’s girl-
friend). 
 145. See, e.g., Shane T., 453 N.Y.S.2d at 593–94.  
 146. See, e.g., In re Lori M., 496 N.Y.S.2d 940, 941–42 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985). 
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1. Outside of Mutability 
Before discussing representative cases,147 it is worth ad-
dressing the question of mutability of sexual orientation or 
gender identity. Many commentators and courts have opined on 
the mutability of sexual identity.148
 
 147. Despite the overwhelming rates in which LGBT youth are victimized 
at home, or outside of home because of family rejection, we have only a few re-
ported cases where families have called upon courts to resolve conflicts stem-
ming from assimilation demands on children’s sexual identity. Extensive re-
search yielded the seventeen United States cases discussed or cited 
throughout this Article. Only five more are discussed in the Dissertation ver-
sion of this project. At least two other custody disputes over gender non-
conforming children are still pending. As they have not yet been decided or re-
ported, these cases are not discussed here. Because LGBT youth are so disem-
powered by parental assimilation demands and family rejection, they are una-
ble to access the legal system. See Sara Jeruss, Empty Promises? How State 
Procedural Rules Block Minors from Vindicating Their Substantive Rights, 43 
U.S.F. L. REV. 853, 854 (2009) (“[M]any minors wishing to keep their sexual 
orientation from their parents do not have access to the courts.”); cf. Martin, 
supra note 
 The innateness and stabil-
139, at 179 (“The greatest indication that courts deny the existence 
of the emotional maltreatment of queer youth is the noticeable lack of reported 
cases that discuss the issue.”). Legal services and advocacy groups do not cur-
rently offer LGBT youth the assistance they might need in order to do so. Cf. 
KATAYOON MAJD ET AL., HIDDEN INJUSTICE: LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND 
TRANSGENDER YOUTH IN JUVENILE COURTS 120 (2009), available at 
http://www.equityproject.org/pdfs/hidden_injustice.pdf (describing LGBT 
youth’s obstacles to gaining effective legal representation in juvenile courts); 
LAMBDA LEGAL, YOUTH IN THE MARGINS (2001), available at http://data 
.lambdalegal.org/pdf/25.pdf (discussing foster care professionals’ lack of “train-
ing, resources, and institutional support” to serve LGBT youth). Additionally, 
privacy guarantees and reporting practices by courts create a lack of aware-
ness among youth, families, social and legal providers, as well as courts them-
selves about these conflicts, which render youth and their potential advocates 
uninformed about their rights. See William Glaberson, New York Family 
Courts Say Keep Out, Despite Order, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2011, http://www 
.nytimes.com/2011/11/18/nyregion/at-new-york-family-courts-rule-for-public 
-access-isnt-heeded.html?pagewanted=all (explaining the lack of public dis-
course about events and practices in Family Court due to its closure to the 
public). See generally Shelley Geballe & Ellen Scalettar, Confidentiality Stat-
utes of Children Protection Proceedings by State, CONN. VOICES FOR 
CHILD. (Nov. 2004), http://www.ctvoices.org/sites/default/files/welf04conf 
statute11.pdf (summarizing each state’s confidentiality rules in child protec-
tion proceedings). 
 148. See High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 
573–74 (9th Cir. 1990) (ruling that sexual orientation is mutable); Watkins v. 
U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring) (opining 
that sexual orientation is immutable for purposes of the equal protection doc-
trine); Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Cri-
tique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 506 (1994) 
(arguing that pro-LGBT litigators should focus on common ground between 
pro-LGBT essentialists who support immutability and pro-LGBT constructiv-
ists who do not); Susan Schmeiser, Changing the Immutable, 41 CONN. L. REV. 
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ity of sexual orientation is a position long supported in LGB 
rights advocacy and litigation. As the argument goes, because 
sexual orientation is impossible to change, it should satisfy the 
mutability requirement for suspect classification.149 The immu-
tability argument found new life in the Ninth Circuit opinion in 
Watkins. There, the court ruled that the immutability factor in 
suspect classification analysis should turn not on whether one 
is incapable of changing a characteristic, but on whether the 
characteristic is “so central to a person’s identity that it would 
be abhorrent for government to penalize a person for refusing 
to change [it].”150
My approach to the issue of parents’ assimilation demands 
on children’s sexual identity extends from the Watkins opin-
ion’s “New Immutability.”
 
151 Because my concern is not immu-
tability per se, but parents’ right to control children’s sexual 
identity, this Article is positioned outside of the traditional 
immutability debate. Indeed, some of the cases I discuss below 
show that parents believe children’s sexual identity is unstable 
and therefore try to influence it.152 However, my claim here is 
that mutability is immaterial to a determination of harm. If 
sexual identity is immutable, parental assimilation demands 
harm children by imposing demands they cannot meet. If sexu-
al identity is mutable, parental assimilation demands under-
mine children’s autonomous development and healthy, thought-
ful identity achievement.153
 
1495, 1504 (2009) (proposing that sexual orientation’s mutability is irrelevant 
to whether discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation should receive 
heightened scrutiny). 
  
 149. Michael Boucai, Sexual Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage: An Argument 
from Bisexuality, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 415, 468–69 (2012).  
 150. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726. 
 151. Schmeiser, supra note 148, at 1512–19 (coining the term “New Immu-
tability”). 
 152. See the discussion below regarding Shane T., infra text accompanying 
notes 204–06; C.O. v. B.C., infra text accompanying notes 222–25; and Smith 
v. Smith, infra text accompanying notes 175–82. 
 153. Healthy autonomy development is tied to positive, accepting, and se-
cure relationships between parents and children. See Waldinger et al., supra 
note 85. Because assimilation demands undermine the parent-child relation-
ship, they also undermine healthy autonomy development. Surely, one could 
argue that parents make childrearing decisions that implicate autonomy regu-
larly. However, once these decisions are outside of parental rights, as courts 
found assimilation demands to be, these decisions are no longer legitimate. 
See, e.g., In re Shane T., 453 N.Y.S.2d 590, 594 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982) (“While a 
parent’s right to raise his or her child remains fundamental, it is equally fun-
damental that children have constitutional rights which must be respected by 
all, including their parents.” (citation omitted)). 
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Michael Boucai makes a similar argument about adult bi-
sexuals in the marriage context.154 He claims that if non-
heterosexual identities are legitimate under Lawrence v. Tex-
as,155 then the state cannot influence sexual identity through 
legislation.156 The same is true in families. If children have a 
right to be LGBT, then parents do not have the right to penal-
ize or eliminate this identity development. I argue that parents 
should not be allowed to influence their children’s sexual iden-
tity in ways that are harmful to the child, whether or not they 
have the ability to do so. Instead, if in fact children are “sexual 
waverers,” perhaps parents should let them waver. This is not 
to say that wavering itself is preferable, though Erikson sup-
ports it as a process beneficial to the stability and health of 
identity in adulthood.157 My claim is only that parents should 
see non-heterosexuality as value-neutral and, as such, abstain 
from behavior that conveys a message of rejection because of 
sexual identity, as assimilation demands do.158
2. Vindicating Children’s Identity Interests 
 
The parental assimilation demands cases discussed below 
seem challenging for courts to resolve. As these decisions 
demonstrate, although courts’ expressed goal is to protect chil-
dren from assimilation demands, even when parents are the 
source of such demands, they are unable to do so effectively 
under current family law jurisprudence. Assimilation demands 
from parents do not fall within existing legal frameworks, and 
the existing frameworks that courts try to apply are not a good 
fit for protecting children. Consequently, there is no adequate 
mode of analysis for the problem at the root of the dispute that 
arises from parental heteronormative expectations. So, though 
courts do recognize children’s interests (and sometimes rights) 
to develop, explore, and express their sexual identity, this 
recognition is not always explicit, or reliably protective. This 
Article offers a framework and vocabulary of assimilation de-
mands that could help courts correctly analyze these disputes 
 
 154. Boucai, supra note 149. 
 155. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 156. Boucai, supra note 149, at 421–38. 
 157. ERIKSON, supra note 55, at 131–34. 
 158. See RYAN ET AL., supra note 106, at 8 (describing family behaviors 
that increase LGBT children’s negative health outcomes in adulthood); Ryan 
et al., supra note 75, at 350–51 (analyzing the link between negative family 
reactions to adolescents’ sexual identity and negative health problems in 
LGBT adults).  
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and develop a jurisprudence better suited to children’s needs 
and identity interests. 
Courts have attempted to relieve children of parental as-
similation demands and protect their well-being in several cas-
es.159 Courts have also protected other types of children’s 
rights—such as their right to informational privacy—as a way 
to prevent harm from parents.’160
The case of Lori M.
 This reflects courts’ under-
standing that disclosing a sexual minority identity to parents 
may have grave consequences for children. 
161 involved a mother’s direct assimila-
tion demand on her bisexual daughter. The New York family 
court explicitly ruled that a minor’s fundamental right to priva-
cy encompassed her sexual identity.162 Lori was fifteen when 
she came out to her mother as bisexual and told her mother she 
had a twenty-one-year-old girlfriend, Ellen. After her mother 
instructed Lori to end her relationship with Ellen, Lori left 
home to live with her aunt.163
 
 159. Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding 
that an Immigration Judge erred in denying asylum to a gay man from Jamai-
ca, reasoning that the abuse the man suffered from his Jamaican father was 
indicative of the persecution he may face in his home country if deported); 
Ixtlilco-Morales v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 651, 653 (8th Cir. 2007) (acknowledging 
that a gay man from Mexico who was driven out of his home after suffering 
abuse from family members because of his sexual orientation established “past 
persecution” even though the man was unable to report the abuse to authori-
ties due to his young age at the time); Petition for Appointment of Temporary 
Guardian, In re Lyn D., No. 259294 (Cal. Fam. Ct. 1992) (unpublished) (on file 
with author) (petition granted without court opinion); Lyn Duff, I Was a Teen-
age Test Case, CAL. LAW., May 1996, at 46 (relating her removal into foster 
care after she escaped a residential education facility where she was forcibly 
placed by her mother and compelled to participate in conversion therapy).  
 Lori’s mother then petitioned the 
 160. See Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 191–92, 197 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (finding in a suit filed by a mother after her teenage child’s suicide 
that a police man who threatened to disclose the teen’s sexual orientation to 
his grandfather had violated the teen’s right to privacy); Nguon v. Wolf, 517 F. 
Supp. 2d 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2007). In Nguon, when a student was disciplined for 
kissing a same-sex partner at school, an administrator disclosed these facts to 
her mother. Id. at 1184. The court established distinct zones of privacy where 
teens may be open about their sexual identity in one context, but retain their 
expectation of privacy in others. Nguon, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 1191. Thus a child 
who is “out” at school still has a right to privacy at home on which the state 
may not infringe without a legitimate interest. Id. The court found that the 
school had a legitimate interest in outing the student, in order to give her par-
ents information required to mount a defense against the school’s disciplinary 
actions. Id. at 1194–95. 
 161. In re Lori M., 496 N.Y.S.2d 940 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985). 
 162. Id. at 941–42. 
 163. Id. at 940. 
  
1404 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:1374 
 
family court to declare Lori a child in need of services.164 The 
mother based her petition on the fact that Lori was in a lesbian 
relationship and admitted that she would not have objected to 
Lori’s relationship with a twenty-one-year-old man.165 When 
Lori testified, she expressed her satisfaction with her relation-
ship with Ellen and said that the relationship was strictly con-
sensual. She also told the court that she was not certain about 
her sexual orientation but that she was comfortable with her 
sexual identity and did not believe she required therapy to deal 
with it.166
Relying on precedent about state regulation of teen sexual-
ity, the court concluded it was unauthorized to intervene on 
behalf of Lori’s mother to control Lori’s sexual orientation.
 
167 As 
in the youth abortion168 and contraception cases,169 as a child of 
sufficient maturity, Lori had the right to make decisions re-
garding constitutionally protected or fundamental rights, in-
cluding her sexual orientation, free of state or parental inter-
vention.170 Since the court found Lori to be mature171
 
 164. Id. Essentially, the result of granting such a petition would be the re-
moval of Lori into foster care and the child welfare system. See N.Y. FAMILY 
LAW § 712(a) (McKinney 1962). 
 and was 
impressed by her thoughtfulness regarding her sexual orienta-
tion and her relationship, the court ruled neither her mother 
 165. Lori M., 496 N.Y.S.2d. at 940–41. 
 166. Id. at 941. 
 167. Id. at 941–42 (“[T]he mother . . . seeks to invoke the State’s interven-
tion to force an end to the relationship . . . [so] the issue becomes whether the 
State may seek to regulate [Lori’s] . . . sexual orientation, as it clearly could 
not do for an adult, or whether her choices in this area are constitutionally 
protected.”). 
 168. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) 
(striking down statutory requirements for parental consent to child’s abortion 
based on the child’s privacy rights and maturity to decide whether to procure 
an abortion). 
 169. Carey v. Population Servs., 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (striking down prohi-
bition on the sale of contraceptives to minors and extending children’s privacy 
rights to include their procreation decisions). 
 170. Lori M., 496 N.Y.S.2d at 942 (“[A] mature child [has the] right to 
make her own decision . . . protected from parental or state interference. 
Where a child demonstrates sufficient maturity, her sexual orientation and 
choices in pursuit thereof must be . . . protected . . . . [W]here a parental edict 
affects a substantial right of the child and is opposed by the child, resolution of 
the matter depends upon the nature of the right asserted by the child and the 
child’s maturity.”). 
 171. Id. at 941 (expressing satisfaction with her performance at school and 
her good behavior while living at her aunt’s home). 
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nor the state could intervene, rejecting the mother’s petition.172 
The court then urged Lorie and her mother to seek help in 
mending their relationship and referred them to counseling 
through Family Court Services.173
Lori’s mother’s intervention was a clear conversion demand 
on Lori’s sexual orientation, evidenced by her concession that 
Ellen’s sex—not her age—motivated the petition. When Lori’s 
mother failed to force Lori into heterosexuality, she turned to 
the state to do so for her through the threat of placing Lori in 
the child welfare system. The court refused to harness the force 
of the state to convert Lori because her mother’s demands in-
fringed on a constitutionally protected right that was previous-
ly extended to children.
 
174
This analysis is somewhat encouraging, though not com-
pletely helpful. The court evaluated the significance of the right 
asserted by the child. Arguably all assimilation demands on 
children’s identities would implicate a constitutionally protect-
ed privacy right. Covering demands also have the potential to 
infringe constitutionally protected speech because they impli-
cate conduct that expresses identity (such as a parent removing 
a photo of her son and his boyfriend from the son’s desk, or re-
moving a pink triangle or rainbow badge from his school bag). 
Therefore, despite its inability to illuminate how assimilation 
demands violate children’s protected rights, the decision’s con-
tribution is primarily the express recognition of a child’s right 
to assert and explore her sexual orientation. In effect, this deci-
sion levels the playing field and brings children’s sexual identi-
ty rights to the level of parental rights, eliminating the default 
in favor of parents. 
 
The question of parents’ right to impose assimilation de-
mands also arose in the custody dispute in Smith v. Smith,175
 
 172. Id. at 942 (“[Lori] impressed the Court with her maturity. It is clear 
that she has given a great deal of thought to her decision and its possible ram-
ifications. And, since the right being asserted by her falls within the constitu-
tionally protected zone of privacy, her mother may not invoke the power of the 
state to intervene.”). 
 
where a father was granted custody to raise a gender non-
conforming child according to the child’s birth-assigned male 
 173. Id. at 943. 
 174. The court looked to Supreme Court jurisprudence to rule that children 
had privacy rights that included sexual rights. See supra notes 165–66 and 
accompanying text. 
 175. Smith v. Smith, No. 05 JE 42, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 1282, at *35 (Ct. 
App. Mar. 23, 2007). 
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sex, effectively forcing the child into gender-conformity. Despite 
this problematic outcome, the general policy considerations the 
court expresses in the decision echo the sentiment in Lori M. 
that a child’s identity interests are beyond the control of par-
ents. The child was ten years old when the lower court granted 
custody to the mother, and thirteen when custody was trans-
ferred to the father.176 Although the child had not been diag-
nosed by a mental health professional, the mother believed the 
child had gender identity disorder (GID) and raised the child as 
a girl.177 She called the child by a feminine name and took the 
child to trans support groups.178 The lower court found that the 
child “displayed some female tendencies . . . as early as age 
two.”179 When the mother tried to enroll the child in school as a 
girl, the father requested a change in custody, so that he could 
raise the child as a boy. Both parents produced video and pho-
tographs of the child dressed in gendered clothes and engaged 
in stereotypical gendered behavior to support their opposing 
positions.180 The lower court heard testimony from five different 
experts. Two experts diagnosed the child with GID and two did 
not. None of the experts recommended treatment for GID at the 
time. The court interpreted the conflicting expert recommenda-
tions as a result of the child’s young age, suggesting a need to 
wait for further gender development.181
 
 176. Id. at *2. 
 The court transferred 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at *1. 
 179. Id. at *4. 
 180. The father showed footage of the child “enjoying stereotypical male 
activities and wearing male clothing.” Id. at *5. The mother produced video of 
the then ten-year-old child “talking about his gender, trying to explain the sit-
uation . . . stat[ing] numerous times . . . that he is a girl, wants to be a girl, 
and that he would like to live a normal life as a girl.” Id. at *7. 
 181. Id. at *9–10, *13. The court also interviewed the child who expressed 
to the court a desire to wear girls’ clothing and have “girls stuff” but did not 
specify the nature of such “stuff.” Id. at *13. The court found that the child en-
joyed stereotypically male activities, had mostly male friends, was attracted to 
a girl, and was unable to name female role models. Id. at *13–14. The court 
also found that the child did not exhibit any feminine mannerisms. The court 
concluded that the child did not have GID and was pressured by the mother 
into “believing that he was a transgender child.” Id. at *26. This reasoning is 
not without flaws—the court’s analysis is laden with the use of sex stereotypes 
as a method for ascertaining the child’s “true” gender identity. See, e.g., Wil-
liams v. Frymire, 377 S.W.3d 579, 582 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (discussing the fe-
male assigned at birth as a child who was “not a ‘girly’ girl as she did not like 
frills or ruffles,” but preferred the girls’ toy aisle on visits to a toy store). The 
use of sex stereotypes under the premise of sex and gender being a binary is 
itself an assimilation demand on the child’s gender to conform to either the 
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custody to the father and prohibited both parents from treating 
the child as a girl or allowing the child to participate in trans 
support groups in order to “dissociate[] [the child] with that 
lifestyle.”182
The appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court, 
finding that the change in custody benefited the child more 
than it caused harm.
 
183 The appellate court affirmed the lower 
court’s decision to grant sole custody to the father and prohibit 
the child’s exposure to gender nonconformity.184 The appellate 
court reasoned that being raised as a boy by the father would 
enable the child to discover a “true” gender identity.185
[The child] needed to be in an environment where he could be treated 
like a boy and allowed to develop as a boy, so that he could make a 
more informed decision about his gender at a later point in life. . . . 
[B]y making [the father] the residential parent, the child would be 
permitted to find out if he was only acting like a girl to please his 
mother, or if he really was a transgender child.
 In the 
words of the court: 
186
As a policy matter, the appellate court saw that the child 
should have the opportunity to form and explore a gender iden-
tity without parental pressures. In effect, the court wanted to 
enable the child to achieve gender identity formation later on, 
thus attempting to preserve the child’s “open future” opportuni-
ties for gender identity development.
 
187 The court was particu-
larly concerned that the child’s feminine identity was a result 
of the mother’s assimilation demands, from which the court 
sought to protect the child.188
 
assigned sex or an opposing gender identity. On the limits of the sex/gender 
binary, see generally Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: 
Toward Social and Legal Conceptualization of Gender That Is More Inclusive 
of Transgender People, 11 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253 (2005). Because this Ar-
ticle focuses on private—i.e. family-based—assimilation demands, a deeper 
analysis of courts’ sex stereotyping in gender non-conforming children’s custo-
dy cases is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 However, the court ignored the ef-
fects of the father’s assimilation demands on the child’s gender 
 182. Smith, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 1282, at *5. 
 183. Id. at *33. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at *4. 
 186. Id. at *31–32. 
 187. Joel Feinberg, The Child’s Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD? 
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND STATE POWER 124, 125 (Wil-
liam Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980) (defining children’s rights as antici-
patory, and parental rights as a means to preserve options for children to be 
exercised when they reach adulthood). Therefore, parents’ role is to maximize 
children’s options and rights—their open future. Id. 
 188. Smith, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 1282, at *31–32. 
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identity. The court’s order that the child should be raised as a 
boy, and also that the child’s access to and exploration of femi-
nine identity and conduct should be restricted, does not ensure 
the child’s freedom from assimilation demands. Despite the 
opinion’s rhetoric, the outcome forces identity foreclosure on 
the child. Had the court clearly characterized the issue as the 
child’s identity interest and questioned how the parents could 
work to protect the child’s identity, it may or may not have 
come to the same result. Perhaps such analysis would still 
point to granting the father custody, but the decision would 
have been more persuasive had the court allowed the mother to 
continue facilitating the child’s feminine identity exploration to 
meaningfully preserve the child’s identity interests and future 
development, whether the mother was the primary custodian 
parent or not. 
Cases like Smith189
 
 189. Id. at *5. For other similar cases, where parents engaged in a custody 
dispute because of a child’s gender nonconformity, see Shrader v. Spain, No. 
05-95-01649-CV, 1998 WL 40632, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 1998). The court 
found that the trial court was within its discretion to grant the father of a 
MTF trans child custody, as a change in custody was in the best interest of the 
child. Id. The court relied on expert testimony from the child’s psychologists, 
claiming that the child’s gender nonconformity was a result of emotional de-
pendence on the mother and that spending more time with the father would 
facilitate separation from her. Id.; see also Buxton v. Storm (In re Custody of 
D.T.J.S-B), 238 P.3d 30 (Or. Ct. App. 2010). Throughout the custody proceed-
ings, the mother had accused the father of several crimes (including sexually 
abusing the child), but all accusations were unsubstantiated. Buxton, 238 P.3d 
at 40. Mental health experts were concerned the mother would undermine the 
child’s bond with the father, and in fact she continuously sabotaged the child’s 
treatment and the father’s involvement. Id. at 37. The mother would transfer 
the couple’s son to his father with the child wearing girl’s clothes and nail 
polish and having pierced both his ears. Id. at 36. The mother claimed this 
was the child’s own wishes and that the father was homophobic for protesting. 
Id. The father’s fiancé stated the boy had told her he was gay because that’s 
what his mother said and that sometimes the nail polish would not come off 
because his mother covered it with Super-Glue. Id. A mental health expert 
was concerned about the mother’s behavior and the child’s consequent state-
ments, because they were in stark contrast with the child’s play style and his 
stereotypical male behavior. Id. at 34. The child’s psychological evaluations 
further found that the child suffered severe stress and development disorders 
due to the custody proceedings, attachment issues, and aggression towards the 
mother and the father’s fiancée. Id. at 34–35. The court ultimately ruled 
against the mother who encouraged and presented the child in gender noncon-
forming ways to the father in order to elicit negative responses from him, hop-
ing to gain an advantage in the custody dispute. Id. As the court put it: 
“[M]other’s pattern of actions has undermined child’s ability to have a healthy 
relationship with father and embroiled child in the parental conflict.” Id. at 38. 
 expose the gaps between courts’ pur-
ported goal to protect children’s identity interests and their 
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ability to do so for gender non-conforming children. The courts’ 
“best interest of the child” analysis was concerned more with 
determining the child’s “true” gender identity and policing a 
heteronormative gender development rather than allowing 
children to pursue and express whichever gender identity they 
wish to develop.190 This reveals courts’ ignorance of gender 
identity issues. Perhaps it is a problem of judges’ unfamiliarity 
with trans issues, or the lack of established jurisprudence 
about children’s identity interests within families, that ex-
plains the gap between rhetoric and result, but in decisions like 
Smith, courts themselves impose assimilation demands on 
children. Because courts so far have not analyzed cases using 
the vocabulary of assimilation demands, they end up under-
protecting children and facilitating parents’ expectations of 
gender conformity. Custody decisions that do not place proper 
weight on children’s sexual identity interests are potentially 
flawed because they privilege parental rights and thus perpet-
uate the law’s view of children as parental property.191
To protect children’s identity interests, it is important to 
translate the Lori M. and Smith courts’ policy rationales—that 
children have identity interests that encompass their sexual 
identity and are beyond the reach of parental assimilation de-
mands—into a broader legal construct that positions children’s 
identities outside of parental rights in a variety of contexts. The 
framework suggested below in this Article, the Family in Need 
of Services (FINS) exception, is one that might address addi-
tional disputes that current family law does not reach. This 
proposal is only one of many possible solutions and will be the 
focus of discussion below. The primary goal of this Article is to 
initiate scholarly attention to family assimilation demands and 
to illustrate them, rather than to offer a be-all-end-all solution.  
 
 
“Child’s grooming and appearance during transfers for parenting time with 
father seem calculated to provoke conflict.” Id. 
 190. Smith, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 1282, at *4. 
 191. Linda L. Lane, Comment, The Parental Rights Movement, 69 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 825, 844 (1998); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: 
Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 
1042–43 (1992) (“At the time of Meyer and Pierce, ownership of humans was a 
legal fact within living memory. Ironically, the Court in Meyer and Pierce 
chose to hang parental control of children on the branch of Fourteenth 
Amendment ‘liberty’ . . . . [T]he right of parental control in Meyer and Pierce—
authored and joined by the Court’s most inflexible laissez-faire conservatives 
and grounded on economic substantive due process precedents—acquires a 
logical framework. Property and ownership were indeed a powerful subtext of 
parental rights rhetoric in the era of Pierce and Meyer.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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Carving out an exception to parental rights might also be 
of use in the line of cases where parents try to impose assimila-
tion demands on children through disputes with their chil-
dren’s intimate partners. By bringing claims against partners, 
parents seek to force an end to the same-sex relationship in 
hopes of directing children back into heterosexuality and differ-
ent-sex relationships.192 Although parents of straight children 
might utilize the legal system against a child’s partner, those 
instances are overwhelmingly adjudicated as statutory rape 
cases taken over by the state. Contrastingly, LGBT youth’s 
parents normally bring civil claims against their children’s 
partners for torts such as loss of consortium or seduction.193
 
 192. In Acevedo v. Williams, 985 So. 2d 669 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008), 
eighteen-year-old Acevedo had been dating Williams’ daughter for several 
months before the mother petitioned a court for a restraining order against 
Acevedo, claiming her relationship with her daughter constituted sexual bat-
tery. The lower court granted the petition not on the basis of abuse or battery 
occurring in the course of the relationship, but instead by finding the seven-
teen-year-old daughter incapable of consenting to the relationship because of 
her age. Id. at 670. The appellate court reversed based on prior Florida courts 
decisions finding sixteen-year-olds capable of consent, and based on Florida 
statutory rape legislation setting the cut-off age for statutory rape of a sixteen-
year-old at twenty-four. Id. at 671. Further, the appellate court found no evi-
dence that the relationship between the two girls was in any way abusive, 
criminal, or injurious to Williams’ daughter. Id. See also Brayman v. Deloach, 
439 S.E.2d 709 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993), which is a case involving a mother’s suit 
on behalf of her minor daughter against a community softball coach with 
whom the daughter had a same-sex relationship, claiming the daughter was a 
victim of seduction. The court rejected the claim on standing grounds and 
ruled that the statute created a cause of action to fathers alone, unless the fa-
ther is deceased. Id. at 711. Since the father was alive, the mother had no 
standing to bring the claim. Id. Despite rejecting the claim on procedural 
grounds, the court did comment on the merits of the seduction claim as well. 
Id. at 717. The court did not find any harm to the daughter, which negated as-
sumptions regarding the inherent inferiority of same-sex relationships and the 
consequent harm to partners in such relationships, particularly children and 
youth. Id. at 712. 
 
 193. Searches through several treatises yielded no results for cases where 
parents filed civil claims (such as loss of consortium) against the different sex 
partners of their children. The sources reviewed were: 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent 
and Child § 122–23 (2d ed. 2012); 14 C.J.S. Civil Rights § 37 (2006); 67A C.J.S. 
Parent and Child § 331 (2002); 5 B. E. WITKIN, WITKIN LEGAL INST., SUMMARY 
OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 1684 (10th ed. 2005); 4 CALIFORNIA TORTS § 56.04 (Neil 
M. Levy, Michael M. Golden, & Leonard Sacks eds., 2013). One case involving 
a statutory rape offense between two boys is Kansas v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22 
(Kan. 2005). In that case, it is unclear as to whether the prosecution was a re-
sult of complaints by parents. I therefore do not consider this a case of paren-
tal assimilation demands. For another statutory rape case between two boys, 
see Commonwealth v. Washington W., 928 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 2010). As of 
summer 2013, a felony child abuse case is pending in Florida: there, the par-
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These instances, in which parents initiate a legal battle against 
children’s same-sex partners, may not be obvious examples of 
assimilation demands. However, these cases do illustrate as-
similation demands and the resultant intra-family disputes, 
and therefore also show how these disputes take shape in 
courts.  
In Landreneau v. Fruge,194 a mother sued her daughter’s 
teacher and coach, alleging that the two women committed var-
ious acts intended to entice her daughter into homosexual ac-
tivity, which allegedly resulted in the loss of her daughter’s 
consortium.195 The mother and daughter had a tumultuous re-
lationship even before the onset of the daughter’s relationships 
with the two women. The daughter had a history of abusive re-
lationships (mostly, but not all of which, were same-sex), sub-
stance abuse, and suicidality.196 After disclosing the details of 
her same-sex sexual relationships to her mother, the daughter 
escaped from her mother’s home and was consequently admit-
ted to a hospital for substance abuse treatment.197 The court re-
jected the loss of consortium claim because the abusive nature 
of the mother-daughter relationship preceded the mother’s dis-
covery of her daughter’s same-sex relationships.198 The fact that 
the relationships were same-sex seemed immaterial throughout 
the opinion, as the court emphasized the abusive nature of the 
relationships as well as the daughter’s troubled behavior more 
generally. However, the mother, who seemed unconcerned by 
her daughter’s different-sex relationships, filed suit only 
against her daughter’s same-sex partners, though these rela-
tionships were not the only abusive relationships her daughter 
had experienced.199 Indeed, the court portrays the other rela-
tionships as far more harmful. The court did not describe the 
relationship in question as overtly violent.200
 
ents of a minor girl initiated charges against the daughter’s eighteen-year-old 
girlfriend. Sunnivie Brydum, Kaitlyn Hunt Is Not the First to Complicate ‘Jus-
tice’, ADVOCATE (Jan. 30, 2014, 7:19 PM), http://www.advocate.com/youth/ 
2013/06/13/kaitlyn-hunt-not-first-complicate-justice?page=0,1. 
 
 194. Landreneau v. Fruge, 94-553, p.13 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/12/96); 676 So. 2d 
701. 
 195. Id. at 704. 
 196. Id. at 705–06. 
 197. Id. at 706. 
 198. Id. at 709. 
 199. Id. at 705. 
 200. Id. 
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Regardless of whether the relationship between the mother 
and her daughter deteriorated as a result of the daughter’s 
coming out, the fact that the court entertained the loss of con-
sortium by rejecting it on its merits illustrates that the court 
did not object to the mother’s basic animus toward her daugh-
ter’s sexual orientation. Rather than treating this case as an 
opportunity to signal to parents that they cannot mistreat their 
children because of their sexual identity, the court’s decision 
could have an adverse effect. The decision could perversely in-
centivize parents to reject children who come out and turn to 
courts to recover damages from their children’s partners.  
Causes of action such as loss of consortium and seduction 
cement problematic views that parents are within their rights 
to control their children’s sexual identity and recover financial-
ly when they fail to do so. These causes of action reflect notions 
of children as parental property at the expense of family cohe-
sion or the parent-child relationship. Many states have re-
pealed the tort of seduction201
 The insufficient protection that the three cases above of-
fer children de facto signals to LGBT youth that their sexual 
identity and relationships are inferior and illegitimate and are, 
quite literally, harmful to themselves and their parents. Nega-
tive messages from parents and the legal system raise concerns 
that LGBT children and youth will be particularly vulnerable 
to emotional injuries from heteronormative assimilation de-
 as well as other laws such as 
child abuse prohibitions or child labor laws. These repeals sig-
nify a legal trend moving away from theories and regulations of 
children as parental property. Perhaps the time has come to do 
away with the loss of consortium tort as well. As we become 
less comfortable with disparities in power dynamics and victim-
ization created by the law, such torts that intensify already ex-
isting power imbalances between parents and children should 
be reconsidered.  
 
 201. While California Civil Code § 49 prohibits “the abduction or entice-
ment of a child from a parent, or from a guardian entitled to its custody,” part 
(b), which prohibited “the seduction of a person under the age of legal con-
sent,” has been repealed. CAL. CIV. CODE § 49 (West 2013); see also B. E. 
WITKIN, supra note 193, § 723 (“Although C.C. 49(b) still forbids the seduction 
of a person under the age of legal consent, the repeal of former C.C.P. 374 and 
375 in 1967 abolished the action. The only sanction is the felony-misdemeanor 
of ‘unlawful sexual intercourse’ with a person under 18 years of age.”); CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 261.5 (2008) (providing both criminal punishment and civil 
penalties). For more on seduction, see generally Douglas E. Cressler, An Old 
Tort with a Unique Hoosier History Finds New Life, 47 RES GESTAE 26 (June 
2004). 
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mands. Assimilation demands burden children’s healthy identi-
ty development, positive and stable sense-of-self, and even their 
relationships with partners and other family members. That no 
case202
II.  INADEQUACY OF CURRENT FAMILY LAW   
 endorses the tactics parents use to enforce heteronorm-
ativity on their children illustrates courts’ intentions to protect 
children from parental mistreatment. Courts have rejected pa-
rental claims and included explicit language affirming chil-
dren’s identity interests. Read together, these decisions reflect 
a trend of limiting parental authority to control children’s iden-
tity through assimilation demands in favor of children’s inter-
ests. However, courts’ willingness to protect children is not en-
tirely helpful to children when that protection is inconsistent, 
unclearly articulated, or poorly rationalized. 
Establishing that parental rights do not extend to a right 
to impose assimilation demands that foreclose a child’s devel-
opment or control her identity interests to her detriment begs 
the question of whether carving a new framework to deal with 
family assimilation demands is necessary. Put differently, are 
existing frameworks, namely abuse and neglect law or the child 
in need of supervision (CHINS) doctrine, sufficient legal tools to 
resolve these disputes, and if not, why? In this Part, I demon-
strate why existing frameworks are unhelpful in protecting 
children’s identity interests. In attending to abuse and neglect 
(primarily emotional abuse), I argue that these exceptions to 
parental rights are inadequate because most assimilation de-
mands are too subtle to constitute abuse or neglect. This leads 
courts to sanction harmful parental heteronormativity that 
does not reach the level of abuse/neglect. Additionally, the im-
mediate and default remedy for abuse/neglect is removal, and 
removal is contrary to this Article’s goal of fostering family co-
hesion. Similarly, CHINS, which is the procedure through 
which truant or “incorrigible” children are removed from the 
home and placed in foster care, also triggers family separation. 
This proceeding places blame for family discord on the child. 
Suggesting that a child’s behavior is reprehensible when she 
asserts her identity rights does not get to the core of the prob-
lem of how parents respond to the child’s identity. As a final 
concern regarding both abuse/neglect and CHINS, courts are 
 
 202. Of the cases discussed or cited here or throughout the dissertation 
version.  
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overly limited in their authority to offer services to the family 
as a unit, or to mandate services when they find the parent’s 
behavior did not constitute abuse/neglect or when the child is 
not declared a CHINS. The FINS framework I suggest below is 
a hybrid of abuse/neglect law and CHINS jurisprudence. In 
that sense, it authorizes courts to mandate family services de-
signed to resolve family conflict, but unlike abuse/neglect and 
CHINS, it prevents courts’ findings that imply either parent or 
child is responsible for the dispute. Because under FINS courts 
are not required as a first step to find there was abuse/neglect 
or an “incorrigible” child, courts can offer reparative family ser-
vices without removing the child. Thus, FINS expands the 
range of cases in which courts can intervene by mandating so-
cial services, but limits the intrusion to less restrictive alterna-
tives like mediation.  
A. ASSIMILATION DEMANDS IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT LAW  
The predominant exception to parental rights that family 
law has created is the abuse/neglect model, where the state in-
tervenes to remove a child from the home when she is severely 
harmed or when her needs are not met. The abuse/neglect 
model has limited efficacy in assimilation demands cases. This 
is partly because of the high bar of egregiousness required for 
abuse/neglect law to restrict parental behavior, and partly be-
cause the interventions crafted for abuse/neglect are generally 
not a good fit in assimilation demands cases. As I will describe 
below, this is not to say that abuse/neglect law is never an ap-
propriate tool to address family assimilation demands—indeed, 
some cases of parents’ assimilation demands have been well lit-
igated as abuse or neglect cases. However, abuse/neglect law 
does not cover the full range of parents’ assimilation demands. 
A complementary framework that might be more useful and 
more appropriate in addressing the more subtle cases of assimi-
lation demands is therefore in order.  
1. Violent Demands: Sexuality as a Site of Abuse and Neglect 
The case law discussed in this Part suggests that parents 
harshly punish what they interpret as signs of same-sex sexual 
orientation or gender nonconformity in their children, and rely 
on their parental rights to excuse the abuse. Parents knowingly 
and admittedly abuse their children in order to assimilate them 
into mainstream, straight society. Regardless of whether the 
abuse is motivated solely by a desire to control a child’s sexual 
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identity or to control the child more generally,203
Shane T. is the first case where a court used abuse law to 
exclude assimilation demands from parental rights.
 courts are 
troubled by these abusive patterns and do not see this abuse as 
protected conduct under parental rights. 
204 Four-
teen-year-old Shane was verbally abused by his father, who 
continually referred to Shane using derogatory slurs such as 
“fag,” “faggot,” and “queer” and told Shane, both at home and in 
public, that he should have been a girl.205 To defend his conduct, 
the father relied on his parental rights and claimed he was try-
ing to “cure [Shane] of certain girlie behavior.”206 The court 
found the father’s conduct abusive because verbal mistreat-
ment constitutes abuse when it creates a serious impairment to 
the child’s health, including emotional health.207 The court stat-
ed that although Shane maintained that he was heterosexual, 
he was clearly distraught by his father’s attacks on his sexual 
orientation.208 Next, the court rejected the father’s parental 
rights argument. The court reasoned that children have the 
same fundamental rights as adults and that even parents must 
respect children’s fundamental rights.209 Parental rights, ac-
cording to the court, do not bar state intervention when that in-
tervention is necessary to protect children’s health and welfare. 
The court went on to deem the father’s reliance on parental 
rights “ludicrous” because of the severe effect the threat of 
abuse had on Shane’s future emotional development.210
This case is seemingly a mild case of assimilation de-
mands. Because Shane identified as straight, his father’s 
 
 
 203. Some of the families in these cases experience abuse in light of sub-
stance abuse or mental disabilities, for instance. Animus to sexual identity is 
present and mingled with the other causes of abuse, but is not always the sole 
cause of mistreatment. Still, parents’ abuse in this context targets sexual iden-
tity and is an attempt to alter it or its expression and inflicts unique and exac-
erbated harms in ways typical abuse does not, and therefore merits the special 
attention of this Article. 
 204. In re Shane T., 453 N.Y.S.2d 590, 591 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982). The 
Commissioner of Social Services petitioned the court to declare Shane and his 
two sisters abused and neglected children. Id. The court did so and remanded 
Shane for psychological and physical evaluation before a disposition hearing, a 
decision which was not reported. Id. 
 205. Id. at 591–92. 
 206. Id. at 593. 
 207. Id. at 592–93. 
 208. Id. at 593. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 593–94. 
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treatment was merely a reverse-covering demand, rather than 
a conversion demand on a gay son.211 Shane’s father’s attempts 
to “cure” his son’s “girlie” behavior were designed not to coerce 
Shane to abandon his identity, but rather to influence him to 
mute any gender non-confirming behavior and flaunt his mas-
culinity.212 Shane’s father used derogatory name-calling to 
pressure Shane to reverse-cover and comply with male sex-
stereotypes.213 But however subtle and non-violent these assim-
ilation demands seem, they were in fact highly coercive and op-
pressive to Shane.214 The inherent power imbalance between 
parent and child made Shane vulnerable to any mistreatment 
by his father, but these particular abusive assimilation de-
mands increased Shane’s preexisting powerlessness. Indeed, 
even Shane’s mother’s intervention on his behalf proved futile 
and caused the father to increase the emotional abuse.215 These 
assimilation demands had such a detrimental impact on Shane 
that the court was concerned for his emotional development.216 
The effect of his father’s assimilation demands was internalized 
homophobia that caused Shane to question his sexual orienta-
tion217 and devalue his sense-of-self.218
The court’s sympathy to Shane’s emotional distress over 
his father’s abuse motivated it to protect Shane from conduct 
that another court could have found permissible.
 
219 The assimi-
lation demands in this case were limited to verbal expressions 
toward a child who was not actually gay.220
 
 211. For the definition of “reverse-covering,” see YOSHINO, supra note 
 A different court 
may have reasoned that directing children into heterosexuality 
16, 
at 23 and accompanying text. 
 212. Shane T., 453 N.Y.S.2d at 593. 
 213. Id. at 592. 
 214. Id. at 593. 
 215. Id. at 592. 
 216. Id. at 594. 
 217. Questioning one’s sexual orientation is not inherently troubling or 
harmful, but being driven to question one’s sexual orientation as a result of 
abuse is. Just as we condemn conversion therapy that might influence one to 
question her same-sex sexual orientation, so too should a parent’s abusive be-
havior targeted at a straight child that causes her to question her orientation 
be equally criticized. Perhaps even more so, when what underlies that ques-
tioning is internalized homophobia that upsets the child’s sense-of-self by the 
mere experience of questioning, regardless of the outcome of such process. 
 218. Shane T., 453 N.Y.S.2d at 593. 
 219. Id. at 594. Because there are so few published opinions on point, I 
know of no case where a parent’s homophobic remarks were found to be per-
missible or non-abusive. 
 220. Id. at 592. 
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is within parental rights, and even aligns with the public inter-
est in a sexual order that enables social continuity through 
marriage and procreation. Yet that court would have entirely 
missed the point that the Shane court saw: when assimilation 
demands are so harmful to the child as to risk his psychological 
well-being and future development, they should be impermissi-
ble.221
C.O. v. B.C. is another case of child abuse through parental 
assimilation demands that targeted the child’s sexual identi-
ty.
 However, relying solely on abuse law as an effective ave-
nue to limit parents’ assimilation demands is a flimsy proposi-
tion. 
222 Here, the court considered the consequences of a history of 
abuse on the mother’s parental rights and the potential for 
family reunification.223 A mother physically assaulted her 
daughter, C.O., when C.O came out to her as a bisexual, leav-
ing visible scratches on C.O.’s face.224 On a different occasion, 
the mother threatened to have a man rape C.O. in order to 
“cure” her of her bisexuality.225 The mother, who later received 
counseling and participated in parenting classes, apologized for 
the violence and stated that it would not happen again.226 As 
C.O. insisted upon returning to her mother’s care, the court re-
united the two.227 Yet, despite parenting and domestic violence 
counseling, violence ensued upon reunification.228 C.O. exhibit-
ed rebellious and violent behavior toward her mother and her 
mother retaliated.229
 
 221. Id. at 593–94. The court relied on Shane’s testimony to evaluate the 
extent and severity of the harm he suffered. Id. The court was concerned with 
Shane’s distress over his father’s attacks on his sexual identity and masculini-
ty. Id. The courts also remanded Shane to a psychological evaluation to exam-
ine the emotional harm he experienced. Id. 
 The court ultimately decided to stop reuni-
 222. C.O. v. B.C., No. B206425, 2008 WL 4670513 (Cal. App. Oct. 23, 2008). 
 223. Id. at *1. These are services the state, through social services profes-
sionals, provides families and parents in order to prevent further abuse and 
allow for families to reunite safely in an attempt to avoid termination of pa-
rental rights. For more on such services, see generally Orly Rachmilovitz, 
Achieving Due Process Through Comprehensive Care for Mentally Disabled 
Parents: A Less Restrictive Alternative to Family Separation, 12 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 785 (2010). 
 224. C.O., 2008 WL 4670513, at *1. 
 225. Id. at *3. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at *8. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
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fication services and to place C.O. and her siblings in foster 
care.230
Though the court expressed satisfaction that the violence 
around C.O.’s sexual orientation had been resolved,
 
231 it still 
found it necessary to protect C.O. and her siblings from the 
broader patterns of abuse they experienced.232 But the court did 
not give sufficient weight to the abuse related to C.O.’s sexual 
identity and obscured the severity of the abuse by overlooking 
its homophobic motivation. The assault that followed C.O.’s 
coming out was not a typical act of child abuse, but a highly vi-
olent assimilation demand. By violently punishing C.O.’s sexu-
al orientation, her mother imposed two demands at once. First, 
the assault can be seen as a covering demand because it had 
the power to teach C.O. that her sexual identity was an illegit-
imate part of the family conversation. Second, the mother’s as-
sault on C.O. demanded conversion by signaling to C.O. that 
bisexuality was unacceptable and deserved violent punishment. 
The conversion demand employed rape threats, which the 
mother admitted were designed to “cure”233
Shane T. and C.O. are examples of assimilation demands 
from parents that constitute abusive attacks on children’s iden-
tity. The parents in these cases harassed and threatened vio-
lence in order to force their children to conform to mainstream 
sexuality or punish their transgressions. Such demands can be 
detrimental to the child’s emotional health and lead to grave 
outcomes for her. Although courts do not use an “identity 
rights” or “assimilation demands” vocabulary, they understand 
that these children have suffered greatly and need the state to 
intervene on their behalf to stop parents’ abusive assimilation 
demands. 
 C.O.—to convert 
her from bisexual to heterosexual in a most aggressive and hei-
nous manner.  
Children are also in danger of neglect by parents because 
of the children’s sexual identity. Many parents respond to chil-
dren coming out by forcing them out of the home and cutting off 
 
 230. Id. at *12. 
 231. Id. at *1 (“[C.O.] stated she and Mother had conversations regarding 
the threat to have a man rape C.O. and C.O. now understood that Mother was 
very angry when she made the threat and was not serious about it, and Moth-
er apologized profusely for making the threat.”); id. at *3 (“[P]arents are able 
to accept C.O.’s sexual identity and choices.”). 
 232. Id. at *12. 
 233. Id. at *2. 
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financial support.234 A stark example of rejection and neglect as 
forms of assimilation demands can be found in the case of 
Dzierson v. Dzierson.235 In this case, as a term of divorce, a fa-
ther agreed to shoulder the full expenses of his son’s college tui-
tion.236 When the son came out to his father as gay, the father 
told his son that he was uncertain about his future participa-
tion in the son’s life.237 When the son reacted by refusing to see 
or speak to his father, the father claimed he was abandoned by 
the son and therefore was no longer obligated to finance his 
son’s education.238 The court rejected the father’s argument, 
finding that the father was the one who abandoned his son, not 
the other way around.239 The father, the court ruled, caused the 
breakdown between the two when he reacted adversely to his 
son’s coming out.240 As such, the father could not claim that the 
son abandoned him or effectively released him of his obligations 
under the divorce agreement.241
Arguably, these cases are not about assimilation demands 
but are about abuse or neglect. After all, none employ the as-
similation demands vocabulary, and only a few speak of identi-
ty. However, the fact that the maltreatment targeted the chil-
dren’s sexual identity, both as the reason for the abuse and as 
impacting the shape the abuse took, demonstrates that animus 
for the children’s actual or perceived sexuality motivated the 
abuse. These courts see how detrimental the effects of this an-
imus can be to the well-being and emotional health of the chil-
 
 
 234. As of 2006, 20% to 40% of American homeless youth identify as LGBT. 
RAY, supra note 115, at 1. The number changes across locations. Bigger cities 
like New York and Los Angeles have larger numbers of homeless youth who 
identify as LGBT, estimated at almost 40% of all homeless youth. Id. at 2. 
Twenty-six percent of homeless LGBT youth point to family rejection as rea-
son for their homelessness. Id. at 14. 
 235. Dzierson v. Dzierson, 661 N.Y.S.2d 779 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1997). For an-
other neglect case, see Catherine W. v. Robert F., 455 N.Y.S.2d 519 (N.Y. Fam. 
Ct. 1982). There, a son responded to his father’s mistreatment (calling the son 
a “faggot” and telling him he acted “like a queer,” among others) by ending the 
relationship. Id. at 522. The father relied on the son’s rejection as reason to 
escape support obligations. Id. at 520. The court ruled that because the fa-
ther’s remarks made him a threat to his son’s emotional well-being and caused 
the son’s refusal of contact, the father could not rely on the son’s conduct to 
release him from his obligations toward the son. Id. at 522. 
 236. Dzierson, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 780. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 782. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 780. 
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dren involved. These cases support the argument that assimila-
tion demands on children’s identity are abusive, and thus par-
ents cannot seek refuge in parental rights when imposing such 
demands on their children. 
In addition to concerns about the harms to children, anoth-
er concern underlies these cases: the concern for family cohe-
sion. The cases above illustrate how assimilation demands can 
split families, whether by court action or independently. In the 
neglect cases, both fathers requested to end their parental obli-
gations, which would also terminate any rights they had within 
the relationship. C.O. and her mother were engaged in such 
pervasive and severe mutual violence that the court placed 
C.O. and her siblings in foster care. The assimilation demands 
those parents imposed on their children hindered their families’ 
ability to accept the children’s sexual identities in a pluralistic 
manner, and the inevitable result was disengagement between 
parents and children. Perhaps the danger of disengagement is 
not exclusive to situations involving abusive assimilation de-
mands. Abuse and neglect cases generally lead to disengage-
ment, as they often involve temporary or permanent removal of 
children and limits on parental rights. However, even when 
they do not clearly rise to the level of abuse or neglect, the ad-
verse impact parents’ assimilation demands have on their chil-
dren’s identity development and on attachments between par-
ents and children carry a significant risk of leading to family 
disengagement. 
2. Rejecting Emotional Abuse as a Mechanism for Litigating 
Family-Based Assimilation Demands 
The previous Part demonstrated how assimilation de-
mands have already been integrated into abuse/neglect law. 
Shane T., in particular, can be viewed as a case to support the 
notion that assimilation demands are essentially a form of emo-
tional abuse.242
 
 242. See In re Shane T., 453 N.Y.S.2d 590 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982). 
 Though I do not claim emotional abuse is never 
a good fit for assimilation demands litigation, I believe it is not 
always the best fit. The law should develop a more expansive 
framework to encompass the instances where it currently 
leaves children underserved and under-protected. As discussed 
above, my discomfort with emotional abuse law as the ultimate 
construct to protect children’s identity interests lies in the 
prevalence of removal and family separation, and the inade-
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quacy of services provided to parents. I am also skeptical of 
how helpful a framework as tenuous as emotional abuse can be 
in advancing strong protections for vulnerable children, when 
the great challenges in proving this particular type of abuse 
leads courts to err on the side of overly protecting parents’ posi-
tions.  
Not all states recognize emotional abuse as a form of child 
abuse.243 States that do tend to employ vague definitions that 
generally include elements such as repetitive behavior from a 
parent hindering the child’s emotional development, acts which 
lead to emotional disturbances, or acts which cause emotional 
pain.244 More specific statutes enumerate particular mental 
health outcomes, including anxiety or depression.245 Both actual 
emotional injury and prospective emotional injury may lead to 
a finding of emotional abuse.246 A parent’s harmful behavior 
could be physical or sexual abuse, or neglect that inflicts psy-
chological wounds,247 but also could be strictly emotional: con-
stant screaming, derogatory or foul name-calling, belittling, or 
ignoring the child.248 The outcomes of emotional abuse cases 
range from family counseling to child removal.249
Like all abuse/neglect cases, emotional abuse cases reflect 
a tension between limiting interventions to preserve parental 
rights and broadening the law and policy to protect more in-
jured children. Perhaps the greatest challenge for courts decid-
ing these cases is to draw the line between reasonable disci-
pline and abuse.
 
250 For example, in People v. D.A.K.251
 
 243. GUGGENHEIM ET AL., supra note 
 the 
5, at 106.  
 244. Sana Loue, Redefining the Emotional and Psychological Abuse and 
Maltreatment of Children, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 311, 314 (2005). See generally 
ANN M. HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE AND ADOPTION CAS-
ES (3d ed. 2012) (emphasizing the causal connection between the parent’s con-
duct and the child’s emotional harm). 
 245. HARALAMBIE, supra note 244. 
 246. Rebecca E. Hatch, Cause of Action for Termination of Parental Rights 
Based on Abuse or Neglect, 53 CAUSES OF ACTION § 6, at 523 (2d ed. 2012).  
 247. Id. (“Courts will generally recognize that where there is physical 
abuse, it will have a long-lasting impact on not only the child’s physical health 
but [her] emotional health as well.”).  
 248. DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 16:8 (2012). 
 249. HARALAMBIE, supra note 244. 
 250. State ex rel. J.R., 257 P.3d 1043, 1044 (Col. 2011) (“The issue of 
whether discipline was reasonable is a fact-dependent analysis . . . . [S]lapping 
J.R., calling her . . . vile names, accusing J.R. of sexual activity, and threaten-
ing J.R. with an exam to prove or disprove her virginity . . . was not reasonable 
discipline . . . . [T]he father’s pattern . . . was not a ‘good faith effort to main-
tain discipline.’”). 
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Colorado Supreme Court expanded the statutory definition of 
“abuse” to include emotional harm to the child.252 The court 
ruled that the general term “abuse” must be “liberally con-
strued” to encompass emotional injuries to the child.253 Limiting 
the definition to physical harm alone would hinder the legisla-
tive goal of securing the well-being of children.254 In contrast, 
the Missouri Supreme Court was careful to explain that not 
every kind of inappropriate parental conduct (in this case, plac-
ing children in multiple consecutive adoptions, probably for fi-
nancial benefit) will sufficiently harm children to meet the high 
standards of abuse or neglect.255 These high bars are in place to 
protect the fundamental liberty interest parents have in raising 
their children.256 Bad parenting, therefore, does not extinguish 
parental rights.257
Arguably, the line-drawing problem between parental 
rights and children’s interests plagues general abuse law and is 
not specific to emotional abuse cases.
 
258 The unique characteris-
tics of emotional abuse make this problem more acute, and it 
often results in under-protection of children or protection only 
in cases where the emotional harm is linked to physical or sex-
ual mistreatment. First, emotional harm is intensely difficult to 
prove, even when a child may have developed a diagnosable 
mental disorder.259
 
 251. People v. D.A.K., 596 P.2d 747 (1979). The mother had refused to 
bathe or feed her child and told a nurse and social worker that she was afraid 
of the child and wanted to release him for adoption. Id.  
 Second, and related, because of the expan-
 252. Id. at 750. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. (“The welfare of the child cannot be protected if courts must ignore 
the very real emotional abuses that a child may suffer. Emotional abuse may 
leave scars more permanent and damaging to a child’s personality than bodily 
bruises from a physical beating . . . . We decline to conclude that an enlight-
ened legislature . . . would be concerned only with the safety of the child’s 
body, but not of the integrity of [her] mind, personality and spirit.”). 
 255. In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. 2004); In re P.C., 62 S.W.3d 600, 604 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (ruling that threatening to spank children, throwing toys 
in the trash to end children’s fighting over them, failing to spend Christmas 
with them, etc., are “inappropriate” and “bad judgment” but not emotionally 
abusive). 
 256. P.C., 62 S.W.3d at 603. 
 257. K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 12. 
 258. DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WEL-
FARE 104–05 (2002). 
 259. GUGGENHEIM ET AL., supra note 5, at 107. One of the difficulties in 
proving emotional abuse is the causation between parental conduct and the 
child’s psychological state, rather than the child’s predisposition to poor men-
tal health.  
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sive liberties afforded parents, social services and law enforce-
ment hesitate to intervene in pure emotional abuse cases.260 It 
is also possible that the delicate balance between discipline and 
abuse is even more elusive when no physical or sexual violence 
had taken place, leading to under-reporting or trivializing by 
victims or witnesses and reducing the likelihood of legal or so-
cial intervention. Because of these challenges to litigating emo-
tional abuse, the vast majority of cases carry some component 
of more tangible forms of abuse.261
Ultimately, then, emotional abuse is an ineffective mecha-
nism to handle assimilation demands from parents. As dis-
cussed in previous sections, many assimilation demands cases 
involve threats of violence or derogatory name-calling intended 
to “cure” the child’s behavior.
  
262
 
 260. Loue, supra note 
 Assimilation demands that find 
their way into litigation as emotional abuse cases that do not 
involve physical abuse or neglect (e.g., failing to financially 
support a child because of her sexual identity) would likely not 
result in intervention protecting the child. Even where inde-
pendent emotional abuse claims do stand on more solid ground, 
because of the aggressive nature of abuse-based interventions 
into the family and infringement on parental rights, the stand-
ard for behavior that constitutes abuse is high, leaving much of 
parental maltreatment beyond state reach. While it is prudent 
to leave most instances of bad parenting, bad judgment, or in-
appropriate behavior out of the courtroom, the standard of se-
verity in conduct and harm that abuse and neglect require to 
permit state intervention will leave many LGBT children who 
experience mild rejection or emotional abuse because of their 
heightened vulnerability unprotected. As much as this is a 
pragmatic concern for the welfare of these children, it is also a 
political-institutional critique on perpetuating heteronorm-
ativity. Using abuse/neglect law and its high standards for in-
tervention sends a message that the legal system condones 
parents’ homophobia and transphobia, as long as it is not egre-
gious enough to constitute abuse or neglect. Instead, a legal 
system in a pluralistic society that is moving toward better ac-
244, at 323. 
 261. Id. at 322–23; HARALAMBIE, supra note 244. Indeed, a Westlaw search 
of emotional abuse cases conducted for the purpose of this project produced 
thirty-four cases, of which at least twenty-five included some component of 
physical or sexual abuse. At least one other case did not find that any abuse 
had occurred.  
 262. See, e.g., C.O. v. B.C., No. B206425, 2008 WL 4670513, at *2 (Cal. 
App. Oct. 23, 2008). 
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ceptance and stronger rights protections for sexual minorities 
should consider harmful parental homophobia and transphobia 
unacceptable, even when they do not rise to the high level of 
severity that is abusive or neglectful. 
This is not to negate any instance of assimilation demands 
as emotional abuse. Emotional abuse is an appropriate frame-
work in those truly egregious cases.263
B. ASSIMILATION DEMANDS AND THE CHILD IN NEED OF 
SUPERVISION  
 However, in recognition 
of the limits of abuse law (and primarily those of emotional 
abuse law), family law should develop a supplemental and in-
termediate framework as well. This intermediate framework—
the Family in Need of Services (FINS) framework—is a refine-
ment of current legal tools, such as abuse/neglect law and 
CHINS framework, that allows additional protection for victim-
ized children, but reduces the danger of state overreaching into 
the family. 
Originally encompassed in juvenile criminal proceedings, 
the child in need of supervision (CHINS) framework eventually 
developed separately to invite state intervention into families 
needing assistance controlling an unruly child.264 CHINS pro-
ceedings essentially rely on status offenses—behaviors that are 
subject to state intervention based solely on the status of being 
a minor. To declare a child in need of supervision, a court must 
find that the child has either been truant from school, or has 
been “incorrigible.”265
 
 263. Perhaps one way to view the relationship between assimilation de-
mands and abuse law is analogous to discrimination and harassment law, re-
spectively. In this analogy, assimilation demands, like discrimination, mani-
fest in a variety of troubling behaviors that reject a child because of her 
divergent identity, as perhaps a woman might be in a male-dominant work-
place. Like harassment, abusive assimilation demands would be those most 
aggressive and violent behaviors. For an example of a case that abuse could 
also be viewed as intra-family sexual harassment, see In re Kelley D., 590 
N.W.2d 392 (Neb. 1999), where the parents only abused the girls—including 
snapping one girl’s bra in the company of others and encouraging the boy to 
physically assault the girls. 
 An incorrigible child is usually defined as 
a child who is habitually defiant toward her parents’ reasona-
 264. NATURE AND HISTORY OF SUPERVISION PROCEEDINGS, CALLAGHAN'S 
FAMILY COURT LAW & PRACTICE NEW YORK (2013); 32 JOSEPH R. NOLAN & 
LAURIE J. SARTORIO, MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE: CRIMINAL LAW § 704 (3d ed. 
2001). 
 265. NOLAN & SARTORIO, supra note 264, § 704. 
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ble and lawful authority.266 Parents and some state agencies 
can file CHINS petitions with juvenile or family courts to re-
move the child from parental custody and into state supervi-
sion.267 Courts generally review CHINS dispositions as early as 
six months after the initial decision to subject the child to ser-
vices and render a final decision as early as a year after the 
proceedings began.268 The court can then either reunite the 
child with her parents or terminate parental rights. However, 
when a court declines to declare a child as a child in need of 
services, it generally abdicates authority to offer the family any 
state assistance toward repairing their struggling relation-
ships. Therefore, the crisis that triggered the CHINS proceed-
ings, which the proceedings were meant to resolve,269
In L.A.M. v. State, a fifteen-year-old girl appealed a lower 
court’s declaration that she was a child in need of supervision 
based on her truancy.
 remains. 
270 The Alaska Supreme Court rejected 
her appeal, finding that she violated the lower courts’ decisions 
by continuing to miss school and claiming that, were she an 
adult, such actions would be criminalized under contempt of 
court proceedings.271 The opinion characterized CHINS as a 
custody dispute between parent and child, where the parent 
moves to enforce her fundamental rights to custody, discourag-
ing the child to “resort to self-help and . . . violence” against the 
parent.272 CHINS is a framework that is concerned primarily 
with the parental rights paradigm.273
 
 266. Id. Additional requirements may be that the child has repeatedly run 
away from home. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 984.03 (2013). 
 It is decisively not de-
signed to consider the child’s best interest, particularly her 
identity, self-determination, or autonomy interests. Nowhere in 
 267. JAMES DWYER, FAMILY LAW: THEORETICAL, COMPARATIVE, AND SO-
CIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 444 (2012). 
 268. 15A J. ERIC SMITHBURN & ANN CAROL NASH, INDIANA PRACTICE SE-
RIES, FAMILY LAW: CHILDREN IN NEED OF SERVICES § 20:4 (2012–2013 ed. 
2012). 
 269. Anne R. Mahoney, PINS and Parents, in CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND 
THE LAW: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN THE HOME, SCHOOLS, AND JU-
VENILE COURTS 337 (Harris et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012). 
 270. L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827, 829 (Alaska 1976), in DOMESTIC RELA-
TIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 876 (Walter Wadlington & Raymond C. O’Brien 
eds., 6th ed. 2007).  
 271. Id. at 878. 
 272. Id. at 879. 
 273. The L.A.M court is so preoccupied with the parents’ perspective that it 
twice makes the point that “[i]t is impossible to discuss severing this relation-
ship without considering the heartache and anguish of the parents.” Id. at 880 
(emphasis added).  
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the opinion does the court consider the child’s emotional well-
being, or her reasons for truancy. Further, the goal of CHINS 
proceedings, per the L.A.M. court, is not to provide assistance, 
care, or recovery for a troubled child, but only to make efforts to 
reunite the child with her parents.274
CHINS proceedings then place blame on the child and her 
behavior and assume (because of the parental rights paradigm) 
that the parents’ behavior is reasonable and lawful and that 
the family’s problems lie with the child. Courts should instead 
be asking whether the parents’ behavior contributed to the 
child’s conduct. Were the parents’ attempts to control the child 
indeed lawful? Was “incorrigibility” the only way a child, con-
sidering power imbalances within families and the general dis-
empowerment of children, could protest parents’ unlawful con-
trol? Andrew R., a case where a child resisted his parents’ 
efforts to involuntarily return him to foster care,
 This line of reasoning re-
veals the court’s real priority in rehabilitating children—
preserving parental rights. 
275 helps illu-
minate these questions. Andrew’s parents placed him in resi-
dential care,276 where he remained for seven months without 
review.277 The court was highly troubled by the effects of invol-
untary placements of children. Confinement deprives children 
of their liberty interests—a potential violation of constitutional 
rights—as well as the “daily consortium of family and friends, 
schoolmates, and participation in community affairs and activi-
ties.”278 Because the confinement without hearing violated An-
drew’s fundamental procedural and substantive due process 
rights, Andrew was essentially protesting unlawful behavior 
from his parents and could not be declared a child in need of 
supervision solely because he refused to return to confinement. 
Denied resources or an opportunity to hold a hearing, Andrew’s 
troubled behavior was the only meaningful avenue he had to 
fight his placement.279
 
 274. Id. at 881.  
  
 275. In re Andrew R., 454 N.Y.S.2d 820 (N.Y. Fam. Ct., 1982), in DOMESTIC 
RELATIONS, supra note 270, at 883. 
 276. Residential care is another term for group homes. Essentially—a fos-
ter care arrangement that does not place the child in a foster family home, but 
in a facility run by the state. Generally, children reside in the facility, but oc-
casionally may be educated there as well, particularly if they have special edu-
cational needs or disabilities. 
 277. Andrew R., 454 N.Y.S.2d at 886. 
 278. Id. at 885.  
 279. Id. at 886–87. 
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Andrew R. and Lori M. are both examples of the incongrui-
ty of CHINS proceedings. If a child asserts a protected right or 
protests parents’ unlawful control, she either becomes subject 
to the juvenile or welfare systems, or she has her position vin-
dicated and returns to the custody of a parent who rejected her 
in an extreme manner.280
LGBT youth are particularly vulnerable to CHINS pro-
ceedings for two primary reasons. First, because of the high in-
cidence of both disputes with parents and truancy among 
LGBT youth, they are more prone to these proceedings.
  
281 Se-
cond, they may be more likely to be declared in need of supervi-
sion because of the misconception that parents’ assimilation 
demands may be lawful or reasonable. Other contributing fac-
tors might include stereotypes associating sexual minorities 
with illegal, immoral, or otherwise socially undesirable con-
duct.282
Because CHINS and the abuse/neglect frameworks focus 
only on one “side” of the family—child or parent—and not the 
family as a whole, any new framework should address the fami-
ly as a unit to effectively account for family disputes around 
children’s identities and parents’ assimilation demands without 
placing blame on either “side.” Establishing the FINS jurispru-
dence first requires a coherent formula for distinguishing per-
missible parental conduct from assimilation demands that are 
an exception to parental rights. 
 These circumstances underscore the greatest flaw in 
the CHINS framework—that it places blame for a family 
breakdown on the child, the weakest member of the family.  
 
 280. Id. at 889 (“This is a sad commentary on the degree of our society’s 
[loose] commitment to treating children with the respect they deserve as citi-
zens. This case demonstrates in graphic terms the need to avoid granting 
. . . unfettered discretion over the liberties of children . . . .”). 
 281. Though CHINS proceedings could be initiated based on truancy, An-
drew R. could be a helpful precedent against such petitions. The Andrew R. 
court rejected the truancy petition because it understood the truancy as “an-
other manifestation of [Andrew’s] deep-seated desire not to be [in confine-
ment].” 454 N.Y.S.2d at 945. Similarly, truancy by LGBT youth is generally a 
result of the discrimination and abuse LGBT students experience in schools. 
See GAY, LESBIAN AND STRAIGHT EDUC. NETWORK, THE 2009 NATIONAL 
SCHOOL CLIMATE SURVEY: THE EXPERIENCES OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND 
TRANSGENDER YOUTH IN OUR NATION’S SCHOOLS 47 (2010), available at http:// 
glsen.org/download/file/NDIyMw==%E2%80%8E. 
 282. See Rosky, supra note 20.  
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III.  THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK: THE FAMILY IN 
NEED OF SERVICES  
The previous Parts illustrated the need for a new legal 
framework for understanding and analyzing family disputes 
around parents’ assimilation demands and children’s identity 
rights. Because children have identity interests in both the 
public and private spheres that may trump the rights of their 
parents, it is helpful to start thinking of assimilation demands 
cases as additional categorical exceptions where children’s in-
terests may outweigh parental rights. This Article as a whole 
advocates for a vocabulary that better explains why parental 
assimilation demands are a violation of LGBT youth’s rights 
and are harmful to their interests. The “identity/assimilation 
demands” vocabulary used here could allow courts to reach bet-
ter decisions for these youth that go beyond the rhetoric of pro-
tection and effectively guarantee that children are not subject 
to unacceptable assimilation demands because of their sexual 
identity. Further, the assimilation demands framework might 
help courts understand other identity-based reasons for family 
conflict, such as children who practice their religion differently 
than parents (or not at all), children of different racial or ethnic 
background than their parents, and so on. Implementing this 
vocabulary in courts’ analyses will help courts develop a work-
able, reliable jurisprudence that emphasizes family cohesion 
and support for youth. This jurisprudence might ultimately in-
clude several suitable frameworks to address the problem. This 
Article proposes one potential solution by suggesting new ways 
to resolve these family conflicts according to the “assimilation 
demands/identity” vocabulary, and accurately position assimi-
lation demands outside the contours of parental rights.  
A. DISTINGUISHING ASSIMILATION DEMANDS FROM PARENTS’ 
RIGHTS 
Courts generally understand that parental assimilation 
demands foreclose children’s identity achievement and violate 
children’s anticipatory rights.283
 
 283. Feinberg, supra note 
 However, courts have yet to ar-
ticulate a coherent doctrinal method to flesh out when parents’ 
conduct indeed constitutes assimilation demands that violate 
187, at 125–26 (defining “anticipatory rights,” or 
“rights in trust,” as those rights which adults hold but whose exercise is con-
tingent on a child’s capacity and development. Rights in trust should be 
“saved” for children until they are able to enjoy them. Violation of rights in 
trust is conduct that denies the child of future options).  
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children’s identity rights. Some courts focus on harm to chil-
dren, but do not elaborate on what comprises the harm. The 
test I propose here—the identity/assimilation test—returns to 
the theoretical root of assimilation demands literature, identity 
scholarship, and case law to flesh out those assimilation de-
mands that target children’s sexual identity and inflict harms 
at levels that warrant state intervention on behalf of children. 
The test assumes that children hold identity interests but 
requires them, their representatives, or parties challenging 
parents’ conduct to show that the conduct infringes children’s 
identity interests in harmful ways. The test consists of two 
prongs: (a) that the parent’s conduct is a heteronormative as-
similation demand on a child’s identity interest, and (b) that 
the assimilation demand caused the child a significant level of 
harm. To satisfy prong (a), a party challenging the parent’s 
conduct would have to show that a child’s identity interest284
1. Coercion Versus Exposure 
 
was a target for the parent’s heteronormative coercive re-
quirement to change, conceal, mute, or flaunt that identity, ra-
ther than merely an effort to expose the child to other identity 
options. Once a party has demonstrated that the parent’s ac-
tion was indeed an assimilation demand, to satisfy prong (b), 
that party would have to demonstrate a sufficient level of harm 
and that the harm resulted from the assimilation demand. 
This first prong relies on Yoshino’s definition of assimila-
tion demands and Erikson’s work on identity to determine 
which parental actions constitute assimilation demands. The 
distinction between innocuous childrearing practices and as-
similation demands is that the latter target a child’s unfavora-
ble sexual identity and attempt to control or manipulate it in 
coercive ways. Perpetuating heterosexuality or gender and sex 
binaries is the impetus for such assimilation demands.285
 
 284. Following Erikson’s theory, identity interests would be those impera-
tive to identity exploration or achievement: developing, pursuing, or express-
ing a sexual identity. 
 The 
 285. Generally speaking, Yoshino and others are concerned with assimila-
tion demands that perpetuate mainstream dominance over minority identity. 
See YOSHINO, supra note 16. Though assimilation demands may be objectiona-
ble regardless of the identities, they promote by virtue of the identity foreclo-
sure they impose on children, I—like Yoshino, Lau, and others—am most con-
cerned about heteronormative assimilation demands because of their 
demonstrated links to harmful outcomes to youth. See RYAN ET AL., supra note 
106; RAY, supra note 115; Himmelstein & Brückner, supra note 126; Ryan et 
al., supra note 75.  
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elements of this prong require that the parental action be coer-
cive and go beyond mere exposure to identity alternatives. 
Exposure increases pluralism, while coercion is incon-
sistent with the pluralistic goals of American society because it 
standardizes children, according to the Supreme Court.286 The-
se concerns regarding the standardization of children are not 
fully alleviated unless children are free from the assimilation 
demands at home that standardize them to their parents. The 
proposed test sets out to increase pluralism within families be-
cause pluralism ensures that children have the freedom they 
need to reach identity achievement without the psychological 
harms that assimilation demands cause.287
Court decisions resolving conflicts between school curricula 
and parents’ religion-based challenges demonstrate how courts 
draw the line between permissible exposure and coercion. Coer-
cion exists when assimilationist conduct requires children to 
endorse a position as their own or disavow it,
 Restricting parents’ 
coercive assimilation demands protects children’s identity in-
terests that diverge from their parents’ identity and acknowl-
edges that a multitude of valid identities can exist within one 
family. 
288 or participate 
in activities associated with that position.289 Coercion is also ex-
clusionary, as it does not make space for different positions and 
considers only one as truthful or correct.290 On the other hand, 
exposure engages children with critical thinking and diverse 
views without coercing them into adopting or endorsing 
them.291
 
 286. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Soc’y of the Sisters of 
the Holy Names, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 In the family cases, some demands were coercive be-
cause of their violent and abusive nature, which harshly penal-
 287. Lau, supra note 11, at 337. 
 288. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 104–05 (1st Cir. 2008) (rejecting par-
ents’ challenge to school curriculum teaching tolerance for sexual diversity be-
cause the program did not require children to adopt such views or reject their 
religion in any way, nor did it require students to actively participate in the 
discussion of tolerance for homosexuality). 
 289. Parents United for Better Schs., Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Pa. Bd. of Educ., 
148 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding that a school’s condom distribution pro-
gram did not require students to receive or use condoms, but rather provided 
voluntary access to condoms at the nurse’s office). 
 290. See Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1068–69 
(6th Cir. 1987); Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 405–06 (D.N.H. 1974). 
 291. See Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1065–70. 
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ized children for their sexual orientation or gender identity.292 
Other parents imposed coercive demands by threatening the 
child with family separation.293 Some coerced the children into 
particular gender presentations that they could not resist by 
opting to present differently.294
Arguably, coercion is not a useful test in the family context 
because every parental action might be coercive to some degree, 
given the power structure of the family and the dependence of 
children on their parents.
 
295 It might be helpful to think of most 
parental actions that exert pressure on children as not mean-
ingfully coercive. That is, the cost of non-compliance is man-
ageable, unlike disengagement or disownment. These actions 
merely expose children to alternative decisions or identities. 
However, when parents’ demands provide children with a 
choice only between compliance and extreme consequences, 
that demand is effectively coercive. Thus, the gay son in 
Dzierson,296
 
 292. See Ixtlilco-Morales v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 651, 652 (8th Cir. 2007); C.O. 
v. B.C., No. B206425, 2008 WL 4670513, at *1–7 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2008); 
Zion J. v. Lillie J., No. A111895, 2006 WL 2709831, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 
22, 2006); Landreneau v. Fruge, 94-553, p.13 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/12/96); 676 So. 
2d 701, 709; In re Shane T., 453 N.Y.S.2d 590, 591–93 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982); 
Catherine W. v. Robert F., 455 N.Y.S.2d 519, 521 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982); Peti-
tion for Appointment of Temporary Guardian, In re Lyn D., No. 259294 (Cal. 
Fam. Ct. 1992) (unpublished) (on file with author); Duff, supra note 
 for example, suffered a coercive demand. On its 
face, he had the choice to abandon his sexual orientation to 
maintain his relationship with his father and benefit from his 
father financing his college education, or sever the relationship 
159. 
 293. See Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2008); 
Ixtlilco-Morales, 507 F.3d at 651; Dzierson v. Dzierson, 661 N.Y.S.2d 779, 780 
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1997); In re Lori M., 496 N.Y.S.2d 940, 940 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 
1985); Petition for Appointment of Temporary Guardian, In re Lyn D., No. 
259294 (Cal. Fam. Ct. 1992) (unpublished) (on file with author); Duff, supra 
note 159, at 47. 
 294. In Buxton, the mother painted the son’s nails and covered them with 
super glue, thus preventing the removal of the nail polish. Buxton v. Storm (In 
re Custody of D.T.J.S-B), 238 P.3d 30, 36 (Or. Ct. App. 2010). In Smith, both 
parents treated the child according to a different gender, without considera-
tion of the child’s preference. Smith v. Smith, No. 05 JE 42, 2007 Ohio 1282, at 
*1–18 (Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2007); see also Shrader v. Spain, No. 05-95-01649-CV, 
1998 WL 40632, at *2 (Tex. App. Feb. 4, 1998) (noting a recommendation from 
the child’s therapist that he spend more time with the father in order to ”cure” 
the child’s gender identity disorder). 
 295. Daniel S. Shaw & Richard Q. Bell, Developmental Theories of Parental 
Contributions to Antisocial Behavior, 21 J. ABNORMAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 493, 
506–07 (1993). 
 296. Dzierson, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 779. 
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and try to somehow finance his education on his own.297
2. The Assimilation Demand Is Harmful to the Child 
 Be-
cause both ending the relationship with his father and poten-
tially not completing his education are harsh consequences for 
resisting the assimilation demand, this is not a meaningful 
choice, and the demand was coercive. A parent’s action is coer-
cive when it leaves the child with no meaningful opportunity to 
resist it without suffering grave costs. 
Once a party has demonstrated that parents’ actions were 
indeed assimilation demands, the party would then have to 
demonstrate a sufficient level of harm and that the harm is a 
result of the assimilation demand. Findings of harm ensure 
that children’s claims are not frivolous, but that they have suf-
fered the type and level of harm that justifies state intervention 
into the family. These would be the cases where parental con-
duct cannot be justified under parental rights. If the child is 
unharmed by the assimilation demands, perhaps state inter-
vention is unwarranted. The typical best-interest test provides 
helpful factors for determining harm.298 These factors may in-
clude the demand’s impact on the child’s short- and long-term 
emotional and physical health, the child’s performance at 
school and relationships with peers, and any substance abuse 
or other risky behavior.299
Several decisions highlight harms that children experience. 
In Shane T.,
 These factors are not all necessary 
for a showing of harm. Instead, as with the “best interest of the 
child” test, courts may weigh each factor, separately or in com-
bination with the other factors, to determine whether the re-
quired standard of harm is met. 
300 for example, the court is quite concerned with 
the emotional hardship and confusion Shane’s father caused 
him.301
 
 297. Id. at 780–82. 
 Shane’s father abused him verbally, yet Shane’s psycho-
logical well-being became the focal point of the decision and the 
 298. For a broad overview of such tests, see, e.g., Jerry A. Behnke, Note, 
Pawns or People? Protecting the Best Interests of Children in Interstate Custo-
dy Disputes, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 699, 701–04 (1995). 
 299. See supra Part I.A–B.  
 300. In re Shane T., 453 N.Y.S.2d 590 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982). 
 301. Id. at 593; see also Petition for Appointment of Temporary Guardian, 
In re Lyn D., No. 259294 (Cal. Fam. Ct. 1992) (unpublished) (on file with au-
thor). Lyn Duff’s petition for guardianship also emphasized the harms she suf-
fered because of her mother’s decision to send her to a residential school set-
ting to receive conversion therapy. Id. 
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material set of facts that led the court to intervene on his be-
half.302 Coercive demands cause identity foreclosure harms.303 
Parents’ heteronormative infringements on identity interests 
are a form of rejection that weaken attachments and create the 
risk for family disengagement.304 Because issues of sexual iden-
tity can cause a decrease in attachment security, and because 
children respond to separation, loss, and parental rejection 
with anger and insecurity, children are at risk to manifest this 
anger in antisocial and self-injurious ways.305
a. Identity Foreclosure Harms 
 It is important 
that any framework that guides dispute resolution attempts to 
preserve or rehabilitate these attachments. 
Coercion is inconsistent with children’s identity interests 
because it leads to identity foreclosure.306 Conversely, exposure 
is a way to increase the number of identity possibilities chil-
dren have and thus preserve future identity developments, 
pursuits, or expressions.307
The decisions discussed above try to achieve the idea of an 
open future for children, at least in principle, if not in practice. 
According to the open future concept developed by Joel Fein-
berg, parents hold children’s rights in trust, and should be obli-
gated to “save” them until their children are able to fully enjoy 
those rights as adults.
 The second prong looks into the 
harmful effects that coercion is likely to cause. The parent 
should be barred from continuing to impose assimilation de-
mands on the child when those harmful effects occur.  
308
 
 302. Shane T., 453 N.Y.S.2d at 592–93. 
 Because assimilation demands burden 
children’s identity interests by coercing children to convert, 
pass, or cover their sexual identities, such parental conduct 
limits children’s opportunities for independent identity pursuit. 
Identity foreclosure violates the child’s rights in trust and de-
 303. See, e.g., Al Petipas, Identity Foreclosure: A Unique Challenge, 56 
PERS. & GUIDANCE J. 558, 558–59 (1978) (discussing events and conditions 
thought to lead to identity foreclosure). 
 304. See, e.g., Gregory A. Wilson et al., An Examination of Parental At-
tachments, Parental Detachments and Self-Esteem Across Hetero-, Bi-, and 
Homosexual Individuals, 11 J. BISEXUALITY 83, 93 (2011). 
 305. Allen et al., supra note 85, at 1233–36. 
 306. See, e.g., ERIKSON, supra note 59, at 238–41.  
 307. See, e.g., Cris Mayo, Pushing the Limits of Liberalism: Queerness, 
Children, and the Future, 56 EDUC. THEORY 469, 472–77 (2006) (demonstrat-
ing the necessity of public education efforts to ensure that LGBT students are 
not closed off from identity possibilities). 
 308. Feinberg, supra note 187, at 127. 
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nies her future options regarding her sexual identity.309 Accord-
ing to Feinberg, in conflicts regarding children’s rights, the op-
tions that privilege the child’s open future by keeping as many 
choices as possible available to her when she is able to make 
her own decisions should prevail.310
When a child’s options are limited, her identity interests 
are foreclosed and her emotional well-being is at risk. The ina-
bility to experiment with different identities and social roles 
causes cognitive difficulties, hampers social ties, and prevents 
identity stability.
 
311 Erikson provides several examples of the 
harms children experience as a result of identity foreclosure: 
“bewildered by the incapacity to assume a role forced on [them, 
youth] run[] away in one form or another, dropping out of 
school, leaving jobs, staying out all night, or withdrawing into 
bizarre and inaccessible moods.”312
Based on Erikson and Feinberg’s work, as well as the case 
law,
 
313
 
 309. See id. at 125–26 (“[The child’s] right while he is still a child is to have 
these future options kept open until he is a fully formed self-determining adult 
capable of deciding among them.”). 
 identity foreclosure harms should constrain parental as-
similationist actions. Courts should view assimilation demands 
that limit children’s opportunities to exercise their identity in-
terest as suspect and should prohibit parents from imposing 
them when they cause such harm as inability to perform at 
school or work, rebellious behavior, social maladjustment, or 
depression. 
 310. Id. at 148–51. 
 311. ERIKSON, supra note 55, at 131–32; PATTERSON, supra note 11, at 544.  
 312. ERIKSON, supra note 55, at 132. Erikson touches on what, in effect, 
are assimilation demands on youths’ identity. While they struggle to forge a 
coherent identity that is natural to them, outside pressures to assimilate into 
an expected, more pervasive identity (i.e. by conversion, passing, or covering) 
may result in a range of harms for that teen. Id. 
 313. For instance, after the initial change in custody, the father in Smith 
required his child to fully conform to a masculine gender identity and expected 
the child to constantly present as a boy. Smith v. Smith, No. 05 JE 42, 2007 
Ohio App. LEXIS 1282, at *3–4 (Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2007). This was an extreme 
burden because it was constant and all-encompassing. See id. Even during vis-
itations with the mother, the child could not escape the father’s demand that 
the child convert a feminine gender identity into a masculine one. See id. at 
*6. These assimilation demands meant that the child’s feminine identity 
would be entirely foreclosed. The child could not use feminine names or pro-
nouns, express a feminine gender identity through clothing or other conduct, 
or consider pursuing medical intervention to transition physically. Id. at *3–4. 
The child was depressed and confused about gender and potentially suicidal. 
Id. at *16–17. 
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b. Weakened Attachments and Disengagement Harms 
Distinguishing between assimilation demands that cause 
family disengagement and weakened attachments between 
children and parents and innocuous childrearing actions that 
do not threaten family cohesion is a helpful line-drawing prin-
ciple. This distinction is founded on what is arguably the great-
est concern of family law—family unity and preservation. When 
assimilation demands undermine the child’s attachment with 
family members or the family’s engagement as a healthy, con-
structive social unit, and when they might result in family sep-
aration or in disengagement between parents and children, 
then the assimilation demands are sufficiently harmful. 
Arguably, family disengagement might allow parents and 
children to conduct their lives separately without the children 
having to conform to the parents’ assimilation demands. Con-
duct that is likely to cause family disengagement is a harmful 
assimilation demand because it exposes powerless family mem-
bers (i.e. children) to the risks of weakened attachments. To 
children and youth who have been rejected by their families, 
the threat of disengagement increases pressure to sustain rela-
tionships by succumbing to their parents’ assimilation de-
mands. Thus, in the unique context of the family, disengage-
ment pluralism314
Because children respond to separation, loss, and parental 
rejection with anger and insecurity, they are at risk of mani-
festing this anger in antisocial ways.
 is not meaningful pluralism. Since the 
identity/assimilation test examines the family’s likelihood of 
disengaging because of assimilation demands, it facilitates plu-
ralism and continued engagement of different identity-holders 
within families.  
315
 
 314. See Douglas NeJaime, Inclusion, Accommodation, and Recognition: 
Accounting for Differences Based on Religion and Sexual Orientation, 32 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 348, 359–81 (2009). Based on NeJaime’s accommodation 
model, disengagement pluralism is a form of pluralism that protects distinct 
groups from competing beliefs by allowing these groups to separate from civic 
life and public education that values diversity, tolerance, and critical thinking. 
See id. for a discussion of NeJaime’s model in the context of public education. 
In families, this would be similar to family separation intended to allow family 
members to retreat without imposing assimilation on each other.  
 Social scientists have 
linked family rejection and weakened attachments to negative 
outcomes for LGBT youth. The Family Acceptance Project 
found that youth who have experienced family rejection be-
cause of their sexual identity are far more likely than youth 
 315. See Allen et al., Adolescent Problem Behavior, supra note 91, at 458. 
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who have not experienced such rejection to exhibit higher rates 
of suicidality, depression, substance abuse, and unprotected 
sexual practices.316 Similarly, Allen and his colleagues found 
that weakened attachments lead to teenage delinquency, drug 
use, depression, anxiety, unsafe sexual practices, and poor aca-
demic achievement.317 Studies also found that insecure family 
relationships undermine one’s ability to achieve either intimacy 
or autonomy within relationships.318 Considering these find-
ings, it is not surprising that family rejection and broken at-
tachment bonds lead to such destructive outcomes for LGBT 
youth.319
Many of the cases included in this Article illustrate that 
parents’ assimilation demands cause family disengagement. In 
cases where a parent’s conduct was abusive, as in Shane T.
  
320 or 
C.O.,321 the assimilation demands were so overtly egregious 
that they brought on family separation as a matter of law.322 
The children in these cases were removed from their homes, 
and their parents’ rights were limited or terminated. In other 
cases, the assimilation demand came in the form of disengage-
ment. In Dzierson323
 
 316. Ryan et al., supra note 
 the father discontinued his relationship 
with his gay son and used the litigation as a way to end finan-
cial obligations toward his child, citing the son’s sexual orienta-
75, at 350 tbl.4. 
 317. See Allen et al., Adolescent Problem Behavior, supra note 91, at 456; 
Allen et al., Conflicts in Families, supra note 91, at 425–26. 
 318. See, e.g., Allen et al., Conflicts in Families, supra note 91, at 426. 
 319. See generally Ryan et al., supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 320. In re Shane T., 453 N.Y.S.2d 590, 593–94 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982) (hold-
ing that father’s verbal maltreatment intended to “cure . . . ‘girlie’ behavior” 
was not within parental rights and constituted abuse).  
 321. C.O. v. B.C., No. B206425, 2008 WL 4670513, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 
23, 2008) (mother threatened to have a man rape her daughter to “cure” her 
same-sex orientation). 
 322. Another example is Zion J. v. Lillie J., No. A111895, 2006 WL 
2709831, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2006), where the court decided to re-
move children from grandparents’ custody. Among a variety of abusive acts on 
grandparents’ part, grandmother taunted one sibling by telling him he was 
gay and should be wearing dresses and high-heeled shoes. Id. at *1. 
 323. Dzierson v. Dzierson, 661 N.Y.S.2d 779, 780 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1997). For 
another case where a father shirked his parental obligations and claimed his 
rights to do so based on the son’s sexual orientation, see Catherine W. v. Rob-
ert F., 455 N.Y.S.2d 519 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982). The court rejected this argu-
ment, finding that the father’s rejection of his gay son spurred his son to dis-
continue the relationship with the father. Id. Thus, the father’s claim that the 
son “abandoned” him could not stand as a justification for neglect. Id. 
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tion as the cause of the relationships’ dissolution. In Lori M.324 
and in Lyn Duff’s case,325 in which Lyn’s mother subjected her 
to conversion therapy, both mothers drove their daughters out 
of their homes because of their sexual orientation. Lori resided 
with her aunt, and her mother petitioned the court to remove 
her into foster care.326 Lyn’s mother placed her in a residential 
education setting, which Lyn escaped.327 Lyn eventually peti-
tioned to be placed in the guardianship of a lesbian couple in 
order to terminate her mother’s custody rights.328 In Smith and 
other custody disputes,329
Family disengagement violates children’s rights and inter-
ests.
 parents tried to convert their child’s 
gender nonconformity by restricting the child’s interaction with 
the opposite-sex parent. Because the parents imposed assimila-
tion demands on their child, it is highly likely that the child’s 
attachment with both parents was weakened, and possibly sev-
ered with the losing parent.  
330 It also strongly contributes to potential harms to chil-
dren’s emotional well-being, physical health, and social func-
tion.331
 
 324. In re Lori M., 496 N.Y.S.2d 940 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985) (mother petitions 
to declare bisexual daughter a child in need of supervision, which would have 
resulted in the daughter’s removal into foster care).  
 Assimilation demands that cause family separation, 
then, should be considered harmful to children and should not 
be permitted as within parental rights. 
 325. Petition for Appointment of Temporary Guardian, In re Lyn D., No. 
259294 (Cal. Fam. Ct.1992) (unpublished) (on file with author) (after escaping 
a residential education facility that performed conversion therapy to which her 
mother sent her, Lyn Duff petitioned to remove her from her mother’s custody 
into the care of a lesbian couple); Duff, supra note 159, at 47–48. 
 326. Lori M., 496 N.Y.S.2d at 940. 
 327. Duff, supra note 159, at 48. 
 328. Id. at 48, 84. 
 329. Smith v. Smith, No. 05 JE 42, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 1282 (Ct. App. 
Mar. 23, 2007) (reviewing father’s petition for change in custody in an attempt 
to raise gender nonconforming child according to the sex assigned at birth and 
limit mother’s ability to engage the child in gender nonconforming identity ex-
ploration). See also Shrader v. Spain, No. 05-95-01649-CV, 1998 WL 40632 
(Tex. App. Feb. 4, 1998), in which a father followed a therapist’s recommenda-
tion to limit the child’s contact with the mother as a way to address the MTF 
child’s gender identity and counteract the child’s identification with the moth-
er. The court assigned custody to the father based on the therapist’s recom-
mendation. Id. at *2–3. 
 330. Rachmilovitz, Achieving Due Process, supra note 223, at 824–27. 
 331. See, e.g., Ryan et al., supra note 75, at 350 tbl.4. 
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c. Harms to Child’s General Well-Being 
The third type of harms that courts might consider in as-
sessing the detrimental effects of assimilation demands are the 
general negative outcomes children suffer. These general 
harms may or may not be a result of identity foreclosure or 
family disengagement. General harms might include short- or 
long-term emotional or physical harm; the deterioration of the 
child’s relationships with siblings, extended family, or other so-
cial ties; or unmet educational or material needs. 
Courts have considered harms in assimilation demands 
cases. In Buxton v. Storm332 a court modified custody to the fa-
ther based in part on the therapist’s conclusion that the child 
had developmental disorders, experienced severe stress, and 
was behaving aggressively toward his father and the father’s 
fiancée. The therapist concluded that these outcomes were a re-
sult of the mother’s attempt to manipulate the child’s gender 
presentation and sexual orientation in order to gain leverage in 
the custody dispute between the parents.333 The therapist fur-
ther cautioned that the child might experience gender confu-
sion or that his relationship with the father might continue to 
suffer.334 The derogatory name-calling by the fathers in Shane 
T.335 and another case, Catherine W.,336
Another example of harmful assimilation demands are 
those that carry severe financial consequences to the child. 
These consequences could be a result of children being driven 
away from their parents’ homes, such as in the cases of Lyn 
Duff
 affected the two boys’ 
emotional health, as it weakened their sense-of-self and low-
ered their self-esteem. 
337 and Lori M.,338
 
 332. Buxton v. Storm (In re Custody of D.T.J.S-B), 238 P.3d 30 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2010). 
 but also can occur when a parent decides 
 333. Id. at 36. 
 334. Id. 
 335. In re Shane T., 453 N.Y.S.2d 590, 591 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982). 
 336. Catherine W. v. Robert F., 455 N.Y.S.2d 519, 521 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 
1982). 
 337. Petition for Appointment of Temporary Guardian, In re Lyn D., No. 
259294 (Cal. Fam. Ct.1992) (unpublished) (on file with author) (describing 
how after escaping a residential education facility that performed conversion 
therapy to which her mother sent her, Lyn Duff petitioned to remove her from 
her mother’s custody into the care of a lesbian couple); Duff, supra note 159. 
 338. In re Lori M., 496 N.Y.S.2d 940 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985) (mother peti-
tioned court to declare bisexual daughter a child in need of supervision, which 
would have resulted in the daughter’s removal into foster care); see also Brom-
field v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2008) (reviewing a deportation pro-
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to cut financial ties with the child, as was the situation in 
Dzierson,339
d. Standard of Harm Across Different Contexts 
 where—despite agreeing to fund his son’s college 
education in a divorce settlement—the father stopped doing so 
after the son came out. Although the court decision does not de-
tail the son’s other financial resources, such as eligibility for 
loans or employment and income prospects, it is safe to assume 
that refusing to financially support a son’s higher education af-
ter promising to do so adversely impacts the likelihood of the 
son completing his studies. 
Courts have not articulated why children are vulnerable to 
harm despite the fact that they have discussed harms to chil-
dren in various cases. The courts have yet to develop a stand-
ard for the level of harm required to establish the parent’s con-
duct as an impermissible assimilation demand. A single 
standard regarding harm may be unsuitable, because disputes 
over assimilation demands are litigated across several contexts. 
The standard should instead be appropriate to the type of liti-
gation. Abuse and neglect cases may involve temporary or per-
manent removal of children from the home. Because removal is 
an extreme intervention that carries grave consequences for 
children, as well as potential implications for parents’ and chil-
dren’s rights,340
 
ceeding against a gay son who came to the United States undocumented after 
his father disowned him because of his sexual orientation and ultimately re-
manding for further factual development); Ixtlilco-Morales v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 
651 (8th Cir. 2007) (the immigration court decided not to deport a man who, as 
a child, escaped abuse at home and came to the United States undocumented, 
finding family abuse because of sexual orientation constitutes persecution un-
der immigration law). 
 the standard of harm should be quite high. In-
deed, to warrant removal, abuse and neglect statutes prescribe 
that the level of harm to children must be, or have the potential 
to be, life-threatening or cause physical disfigurement or im-
 339. Dzierson v. Dzierson, 661 N.Y.S.2d 779 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1997). The 
court enforced a divorce agreement in which the father agreed to finance the 
son’s college education. Id. at 783–83. The father’s claim that the son’s aban-
donment of the father released the father from his obligation to support the 
child was rejected by the court. Id. at 780. The court found that the son’s 
abandonment was a consequence of the father’s rejection of his son because of 
the son’s sexual orientation. Id. 
 340. See generally Rachmilovitz, Achieving Due Process, supra note 223 
(discussing removal of children and termination of parental rights in abuse 
and neglect cases, the potential harm to children from removal and foster care 
placement, and the risk of violation of parents’ and children’s substantive due 
process rights). 
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pairment, or a substantial impairment to intellectual or psy-
chological functions.341
In custody cases the standard of harm to the child is gen-
erally lower, and a showing of “reasonable and substantial like-
lihood of immediate or future impairment” is sufficient.
 
342 Thus, 
harm is established when parents’ acts jeopardize the child’s 
mental or physical well-being.343 In custody disputes involving 
third parties’ challenges to parental rights, the standard is in-
termediate—again, as a way to protect parents’ fundamental 
rights.344 This standard tends to require clear and convincing 
evidence that the parent is not acting in the child’s best inter-
est.345
This lower standard for harm is, in my opinion, best suited 
for cases between children and parents brought under the 
FINS framework. To fend off frivolous claims by children turn-
ing to courts in an attempt to have mundane parental decisions 
overruled, not just any showing of harm would be sufficient. 
However, because of LGBT children’s heightened vulnerability 
and their rampant victimization, they should not be required to 
meet a high standard that additionally burdens their position 
in the litigation process. A standard of reasonable harm or sub-
stantial likelihood of harm balances the child’s strong interest 
in limiting parents’ assimilation demands and protecting her 
identity interests but also accounts for the fact that mildly as-
similationist parental conduct might not create significant 
harm and that parents’ fundamental rights should be protect-
ed, as well. 
 
B. PROMOTING FAMILY COHESION 
The FINS framework prioritizes neither parents nor chil-
dren and provides an avenue for children to solicit help when 
their parents impose assimilation demands on their identities. 
 
 341. See, e.g., Andrew Ford, Note, State Child Abuse Laws: Their Failure to 
Protect Children with Gender Identity Disorder, 49 FAM. CT. REV. 642, 645–47 
(2011) (critiquing shortcomings of current child abuse statutes specifically be-
cause of their inefficacy in addressing the types of harm gender non-
conforming children face). 
 342. In re Marriage of Hadeen, 619 P.2d 374, 382 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980). 
 343. In re Marriage of Jensen-Branch, 899 P.2d 803, 807–08 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1995). 
 344. See Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn't Know Best: 
Quasi-Parents and Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. 
REV. 865, 885 (2003). 
 345. See id. 
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Under the test proposed here, children bringing such petitions 
would have a chance to voice their preferences, defend their 
identity interests, and receive assistance to ensure family cohe-
sion. Below, I discuss the obstacles the legal system currently 
faces in providing practical tools for families and present medi-
ation as one such tool that could be incorporated to facilitate 
family cohesion. 
1. Current Limitations on Remedies 
Courts’ incoherence around children’s identity rights and 
the limits of parents’ assimilation demands, when coupled with 
inadequate remedies, leaves LGBT youth unprotected. The le-
gal system and its companion social services are currently ill-
equipped to meet the needs of families and their LGBT chil-
dren.346 These systems are unable to repair family relationships 
or prevent family separation or negative outcomes for youth be-
cause of parents’ rejection and assimilation demands. In abuse 
and neglect cases, courts have more authority in ordering social 
services that can foster better relationships between the parent 
and the child.347 However, the default course of action in abuse 
and neglect litigation is removing a child into the welfare sys-
tem during provision of services to parents, or once the services 
fail.348
Outside of the abuse/neglect framework, courts are severe-
ly restricted in their authority to mandate any sort of social 
services support for families.
 Abuse and neglect cases effectively expose families to 
higher risk of disengagement. Because LGBT youth are exceed-
ingly vulnerable to harms of homelessness, the juvenile system, 
and foster care, disengagement holds grim prospects. 
349 Many of the cases involving 
LGBT youth and their parents are therefore unlikely to lead to 
state intervention that could mend these relationships. The 
general services currently available are typically limited to 
abuse and neglect cases.350
 
 346. See, e.g., Matthew J. Hulstein, Recognizing and Respecting the Rights 
of LGBT Youth in Child Custody Proceedings, 27 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & 
JUST. 171, 179–85 (2012) (discussing deficiencies of the current legal frame-
work in safeguarding LGBT youth’s rights). 
 As such, they are unhelpful to LGBT 
 347. See, e.g., Steve Baron, The Scope of Family Court Intervention, 4 J. 
CTR. FOR FAM. CHILD & CTS. 115, 117 (2003). 
 348. See Thomas L. Hafemeister, Castles Made of Sand? Rediscovering 
Child Abuse and Society’s Response, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 819, 842–44 (2010). 
 349. See id. at 872–85 (discussing standards for removal and remedial 
steps short of removal). 
 350. See Ford, supra note 341, at 645–47. 
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youth and their families because they do not confront and re-
solve parental homophobia or transphobia. When assimilation 
demands do not rise to the level of abuse or neglect and are ad-
judicated under other frameworks, courts cannot mandate the-
se services even when they believe families would benefit from 
them. 
An example for this is Lori M., where the court encouraged 
Lori and her mother to reconcile and referred them to counsel-
ing, indicating that they should resolve their conflict in the 
spirit of the decision.351 It appears that the court would want 
Lori’s mother to learn to accept Lori’s sexual identity to restore 
their relationship. However, the court seemed frustrated with 
its inability to order participation in counseling, stating that 
though counseling was voluntary, “the Court urges both parties 
to work toward a rehabilitation of the parent-child relation-
ship.”352 Although Lori’s identity rights were vindicated in 
court, without counseling Lori would remain vulnerable to her 
mother’s mistreatment. The recognition of Lori’s rights does not 
ensure a better, more accepting relationship between her and 
her mother.353
To clarify, I do not suggest that courts must always man-
date services, or that services are always appropriate. In some 
cases families might be able to conduct their post-litigation re-
lationships without social services, or the relationships may be 
beyond repair, and services would be futile. The purpose of 
FINS is to provide the option of services when appropriate in 
light of the merits and circumstances of the case, rather than 
 Lori, therefore, is free to be bisexual, but is left to 
her own devices as far as negotiating her future relationship 
with her mother. A FINS framework would help resolve this 
double bind. Once a child alerts the legal system or social ser-
vices that there is an assimilation demand conflict in the fami-
ly, and a court finds the parent’s behavior constitutes an assim-
ilation demand, the court should then be authorized to 
mandate services for the family. Upon further review and the 
conclusion that services had failed, the FINS proceedings could 
transform into an abuse/neglect case. Only then should courts 
consider removal—as a last resort. 
 
 351. In re Lori M., 496 N.Y.S.2d 940, 943 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985) (“It would 
be in the interest of both Lori and her mother to reconcile their differences 
within the framework of this decision. Accordingly a referral is made for both 
of them to Family Court Services for counseling to assist them in implement-
ing this decision.”). 
 352. Id. 
 353. See id. 
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the type of litigation (i.e. abuse or neglect cases). Therefore, the 
contribution of extending intervention is the opportunity to ex-
plore compromise and assistance at parents’ or children’s re-
quest, at social services professionals’ recommendation, or by 
court mandate and discretion. 
There are obstacles inherent to the legal system that cur-
rently hinder dispute resolution and require the rethinking of 
extra-litigation strategies. Professor Clare Huntington354 ob-
serves that because of its adversarial nature, both substantive-
ly and procedurally, family law generally achieves dispute reso-
lutions in ways that exacerbate, rather than alleviate, family 
conflict.355 Similarly, the noninterventionist position that the 
state normally takes toward family law hinders policies that 
might contribute to family repair.356 Huntington suggests em-
ploying positive psychology research and practice to reform 
family law to promote human and family flourishing: “to pro-
vide the best possible environments for their [family] members 
in light of individual needs while still allowing for the tremen-
dous pluralism that marks family life in a diverse society.”357 To 
do so, Huntington proposes that family law become less adver-
sarial and incorporate alternative dispute resolution methods 
such as mediation, collaborative law, and family group confer-
encing.358 Building on Huntington’s basic proposal, courts re-
solving family disputes regarding children’s identity and par-
ents’ assimilation demands should be able to help parties take 
positive steps toward family cohesion and support for their 
LGBT children. Courts might consider mandating either indi-
vidual or group therapy for parents and children, submitting a 
parenting plan, requiring parenting training that focuses on 
sexual diversity and LGBT identities, or ordering participation 
in community support groups such as Parents, Families, 
Friends, and Allies of Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG).359
 
 354. Clare Huntington, Happy Families? Translating Positive Psychology 
Into Family Law, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 385, 393–94 (2009). 
 
 355. Id. at 393. 
 356. Id. at 393–94 (“Repair is not necessarily stitching back together the 
family, but rather attending to the emotional aspects of family relationships—
repairing relationships, even as legal relationships may change.”). 
 357. Id. at 395. 
 358. Id. at 406. 
 359. Get Support, PFLAG.ORG, http://community.pflag.org/getsupport (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2014). 
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2. Mediation 
LGBT youth and their parents could benefit from a system 
of litigation alternatives. There is a variety of professionals 
that children and families could come across who can help mit-
igate crises in families.360 But perhaps Huntington’s sugges-
tions would best come to life through establishing court-ordered 
mediation. In mediation, parties resolve their conflicts with the 
help of a neutral third party who facilitates better understand-
ing of the parties’ positions, identifying mutual perspectives 
and discovering potential solutions.361 Because the mediation 
process is motivated in part by the parties’ emotional needs, it 
may address a variety of concerns with which the parties 
struggle—beyond the narrow legal issues.362 In many states, 
mediation has now become par for the course in divorce, custo-
dy, and CHINS disputes, and mediators offer their services 
both privately and through courts.363 The increased use of me-
diation in these areas is designed to motivate parents towards 
better decision-making for children,364 and to better account for 
children’s needs, interests, and perspectives in family dispute 
resolution.365
In a prominent longitudinal study, researchers randomly 
assigned families to mediation and compared their outcomes to 
 
 
 360. My goal here is to make only initial suggestions about this. I am 
aware of class-based critiques that not all families have access to supportive 
doctors, mental health professionals and so on, or the class and race-based cri-
tiques that these professionals’ involvement increases state policing of minori-
ty parents that serves to criminalize and victimize them or remove their chil-
dren. As this is merely an attempt to stimulate conversation, in depth 
discussion of these critiques is out of the scope of this Article. 
 361. DOUGLAS ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 914 (3d ed. 
2012).  
 362. Id. 
 363. See CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., MEDIATION: PRACTICE, POLICY, 
AND ETHICS 98 (2006). 
 364. Katherine T. Bartlett, U.S. Custody Law and Trends in the Context of 
the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 
5, 6 (2002).  
 365. Joan B. Kelly, Psychological and Legal Interventions for Parents and 
Children in Custody and Access Disputes: Current Research and Practice, 10 
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 129, 137 (2002) (“Mandatory mediation conveys a clear 
policy and social message to parents and lawyers that discussion of children’s 
needs and efforts to settle disputes in more collaborative forums are preferred 
over more adversarial processes.”). 
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families who continued to litigate custody disputes.366 In a 
twelve-year follow-up, co-parenting conflict decreased for medi-
ation families and increased in litigation families.367 The study 
concluded that mediation improves relationships in families 
and protects them from the harmful effects of litigation, be-
cause mediation is non-adversarial,368 and because it is cost- 
and time-efficient.369 The decreased cost of mediation compared 
to litigation should make it an appealing form of state interven-
tion.370 Because the process includes children and their perspec-
tives, mediation is an important mechanism to potentially pre-
vent the negative outcomes associated with family conflicts. 
Indeed, perceived control over decisions can help improve men-
tal health,371 and perhaps facilitate better autonomy develop-
ment in children.372
Though including children in mediation between parents is 
controversial, the benefits of children’s participation increases 
when the child herself is party to the conflict, as would be the 
case under FINS and other assimilation demands disputes. 
One common goal is guaranteeing the child is not burdened 
with adult decision-making, for instance, by being expected to 
favor one parent’s custody over the other’s.
 
373 But excessive cau-
tion over turning the child into the decision-maker has led to 
the exclusion of children from entire mediation processes that 
have long-term and life-altering impact on them.374
 
 366. David A. Sbarra & Robert E. Emery, Deeper into Divorce: Using Actor-
Partner Analyses to Explore Systemic Differences in Coparenting Conflict Fol-
lowing Custody Dispute Resolution, 22 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 144 (2008). 
 Instead, 
mediators could solicit children’s opinions and help them ex-
press their feelings about the conflict, while leaving them out of 
 367. Id. at 150. 
 368. Id. 
 369. Kelly, supra note 365, at 138. 
 370. For information on developing alternatives that rely on social services, 
but are cost-effective compared to litigation, see Rachmilovitz, Achieving Due 
Process, supra note 223, at 847. Dorothy Roberts makes a similar argument 
about state funding of social services as a more cost-effective expenditure than 
foster care to resolve domestic violence. ROBERTS, supra note 258, at 134–35. 
 371. Kelly, supra note 365, at 149. 
 372. See ERIKSON, supra note 59, at 249–53.  
 373. Robert E. Emery, Easing the Pain of Divorce for Children: Children’s 
Voices, Causes of Conflict, and Mediation Comments on Kelly’s “Resolving 
Child Custody Disputes”, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 164, 168–69 (2002). 
 374. Kelly, supra note 365, at 148. 
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the negotiating meetings.375 Though excluding a child from the 
negotiation stage is problematic when the mediation is meant 
to resolve a conflict between the parents and the child herself, 
there are ways to mitigate this concern by including legal coun-
sel for the child. Another concern for mediation in FINS or as-
similation demands cases mirrors the objection to mediation in 
domestic violence cases—that the power imbalance negates the 
weaker party’s autonomy and her ability to stand up for her in-
terests.376 But, as in domestic violence cases, safeguards can 
counter these concerns.377
Possibly the greatest benefit of mediation in resolving con-
flicts between parents and children is that the process allows 
parents to listen to children’s perspectives with respect, which 
validates children’s thinking, needs, and feelings.
 One such safeguard would be select-
ing a mediator trained to understand the imbalanced dynamics 
between parents and children, who is familiar with the devel-
opment of autonomy and agency in children and youth and 
(perhaps most importantly) sensitive to the particular chal-
lenges of assimilation demands on children’s identities, espe-
cially those on LGBT youth. 
378 The process 
softens the conflict and fosters productive communication.379 
Indeed, mediation has been found to be particularly advanta-
geous when parents and children’s views are polarized,380 thus 
preventing disengagement even in the most extreme of family 
conflicts. Mediation brings Douglas’s Yoder dissent to life be-
cause it gives children a voice and signals that their identities 
and interests are valued.381
C. POTENTIAL CHALLENGES TO FINS 
 
Despite the recognition of children’s identity interests and 
the potential risk assimilation demands pose to children’s well-
being, advocating increased protections for children’s identities 
might elicit concerns. Here, I contend with three possible coun-
terarguments to the interventions I propose in this Article. 
 
 375. Solangel Maldonado, Taking Account of Children’s Emotions: Anger 
and Forgiveness in “Renegotiated Families,” 16 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 443, 457 
(2009). 
 376. Bartlett, supra note 364, at 13. 
 377. Id. at 14. 
 378. Kelly, supra note 365, at 151. 
 379. See id. at 159. 
 380. Id. at 160. 
 381. See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 1526 (1972) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
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1. Which Identity to Protect? 
As a natural progression of this Article’s focus on children’s 
sexual identity, the FINS framework is designed with family 
conflicts around children’s sexual orientation and gender iden-
tity in mind. That being said, it may very well be applicable to 
other circumstances where children’s identities diverge from 
their parents—for example children in interracial or interfaith 
families, children who practice religious faiths that differ from 
their parents’, children with disabilities (or able-bodied chil-
dren of parents with disabilities),382 or children who are adopted 
into families of a different racial or ethnic background.383 Yet 
expanding the potential scope of identity-based FINS claims 
raises concerns over the limits of identity protections. Should 
any identity be protected from parental assimilation demands 
under FINS?384 Would a child whose parents are pressuring her 
to play sports over music have a claim?385
In order to craft a limiting principle, it may be helpful to 
rely on both the legal and psychological conceptions of identity. 
On both the constitutional and state levels, the law has recog-
nized several identity categories that warrant protection. These 
are primarily race, religion, ethnicity, sex and gender, and, de-
pending on the jurisdiction, sexual orientation or gender identi-
ty.
 Should she? 
386
 
 382. See, e.g., Jenny L. Singleton & Matthew D. Tittle, Deaf Parents and 
Their Hearing Children, 5 J. DEAF STUD. DEAF EDUC. 221 (2000).  
 This is a good point of departure, but it is limited because 
 383. See, e.g., Kim H. Pearson, Legal Solutions for API Transracial Adopt-
ees, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2013). 
 384. The original test articulated above seeks to identify “heteronormative” 
demands. Generally, expanding this test to additional identity groups would 
now search for demands that create preferences for other mainstream identi-
ties and devalue nonmainstream identities. Still, the mainstream-minority 
identity dichotomy is not completely helpful in identifying troubling demands. 
As I discuss below, perhaps salience is a better marker for identities that war-
rant protections.  
 385. Of course, these pressures might have a particular contextual mean-
ing when explained through gendered, cultural, or other lenses. These circum-
stances notwithstanding, parents may reasonably elect to promote certain ac-
tivities over others. To distinguish when this constitutes an assimilation 
demand, it is helpful to stick with my suggestions regarding the constitutional 
framework of identity protection, or the socio-psychological theories on identi-
ty formation and identity salience. See supra notes 373–75 and accompanying 
text. 
 386. See, e.g., Statewide Employment Laws and Policies, HUMAN RIGHTS 
CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/employment_laws_062013 
.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2014); Statewide School Anti-Bullying Laws & Poli-
cies, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/ 
school_anti-bullying_laws_062013.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2014); Statewide 
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of the diversity of jurisdictions, and because the law might be 
slow to reflect social change; some identities (like LGBT identi-
ties) might remain unprotected in some jurisdictions, or for 
some purposes.387 Psychology’s identity theories fill in that gap 
and suggest flexibility in identity protection. Utilizing identity 
theory, Holning Lau recommends two limits on the identities 
that the law should protect from assimilation demands.388 First, 
he advocates for protecting identities that are a result of the 
development process Erikson envisioned: exploration and ulti-
mately commitment to ideas, values, and goals associated with 
a social category.389 The other limit is that the identity must be 
salient to that person’s sense-of-self, as society constructs cer-
tain identities or traits as more vulnerable yet more significant 
to one’s sense-of-self.390
Establishing the scope of children’s identity interests in the 
face of parents’ assimilation demands might leave one to won-
der, why the preoccupation with sexuality? Is this a project 
about children’s identities or about children’s sexuality? It is 
both. Sexuality is both typical and unique among children’s 
identities. It is typical because it is only one of several exam-
ples where parents might impose assimilation demands on 
children. But sexuality is also unique because of the vulnerabil-
ity it creates in children. The vulnerability of LGBT children to 
harmful assimilation demands is evident in the case law and 
the empirical data discussed throughout this Article. That 
LGBT children are subject to parental rejection in such ram-
pant and excruciating ways is telling.  
 
 
School Non-Discrimination Laws & Policies, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http:// 
www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/school_non-discrimination_laws_062013.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2014). 
 387. For instance, in education, federal law protects against sex discrimi-
nation through Title IX, which some courts have understood to protect trans 
students’ rights to dress in clothes associated with their gender identity rather 
than their birth-assigned sex. Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000). However, trans identity is not protected from 
marriage inequality. See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 232 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1999).  
 388. Lau, supra note 11, at 331. 
 389. Id. at 331–32. 
 390. See id. Of course, for some people a particular type of identity category 
might be more salient than it might be to someone else. This analysis is per-
haps more muddled in the case of intersectional identities. However, since this 
is a project that aims to begin a conversation specifically on children’s sexual 
identity, it cannot do justice to the hugely important matter of 
intersectionality, which warrants its own scholarly attention. I leave the ques-
tions raised by intersectional identities to future projects.  
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2. Reporting 
Opponents of the FINS proposal may point out that per-
haps it does not sufficiently address problems of access to 
courts, or does not clarify how FINS claims would be initiated. 
Further, it might be improper to burden already disadvantaged 
children with filing claims against their own parents. This is an 
extremely difficult matter, but it is probably no more difficult to 
contend with than if it were raised in the context of existing 
abuse or neglect frameworks. As in cases of abuse and neglect, 
interventions to protect children from assimilation demands 
require a comprehensive, multi-leveled solution. For instance, 
school administrators who become aware of family conflicts can 
serve as a resource for children and parents in learning how to 
resolve conflicts in a reparative way. Of course, many school 
environments are not supportive of LGBT youth, but if they 
were to improve they could be very useful sources of support for 
families as well. It is also important to ensure that reporting 
follows consultation with the child. Even well-meaning school 
staff or faculty can worsen a child’s situation by “outing”391 her 
to her parents without her knowledge or consent. Further, 
courts have ruled that “outing” by school and other state offi-
cials violates children’s informational privacy rights and that 
state actors must have a compelling state interest warranting 
the disclosure.392
It is important to note that a big first step is shedding light 
on the harms of assimilation demands from parents. Starting a 
conversation about children’s identity interests and the im-
portance of protecting them is pivotal for children, educators, 
lawyers, and others to begin the work toward eliminating as-
similation demands and supporting families of LGBT youth. 
This Article aims to inspire this conversation. 
 
 
 391. “Outing” is a third party’s disclosure of one’s sexual orientation or 
gender identity. See STUART BIEGEL, THE RIGHT TO BE OUT: SEXUAL ORIENTA-
TION AND GENDER IDENTITY IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS, at xiii–xv (2010). 
 392. See Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(finding that a policeman, who threatened to tell a minor’s grandfather that 
the minor was gay if the minor did not tell his grandfather himself, acted upon 
no legitimate state interest; the minor committed suicide because of the 
threat); Nguon v. Wolf, 517 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (finding that 
students have an expectation of privacy that school officials do not disclose 
their sexual orientation to parents, even if the students are out at school. 
School officials can defend their decision to disclose when they have a compel-
ling state interest in outing a student. In this case, the interest of allowing 
parents to mount a defense against the school’s disciplinary actions justified 
the disclosure). 
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3. “Bad Parenting” Claims 
Advocates of the parental rights paradigm may also be 
concerned that this Article lays a path to judicial oversight of 
reasonable, or even “bad,” parenting. But this Article attempts 
to weed out the cases where real and significant harm is done 
to children because parents reject them on the basis of their 
most salient sense of who they are. However, even if children 
would attempt to second-guess their parents and bring frivo-
lous suits, at least one opinion, Miner v. Garrity,393 reassures us 
that courts are not amenable to them. There, two adult chil-
dren brought tort claims against their mother for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress.394 After their divorce, the mother and father 
shared custody of their daughter, while the father had sole cus-
tody of their son.395 The children claimed that at times their 
mother favored one child over the other, refused to purchase 
gifts for them, failed to send the son care packages at college 
and purchase prom dresses for the daughter, refused to pay 
their medical expenses without seeing receipts, demanded the 
daughter return home at midnight after a party, and threat-
ened to take the son to the police station when he refused to 
put on a seatbelt in the car.396 The trial court dismissed the case 
for failure to show a cause of action, in that the children did not 
demonstrate they were in danger or feared for their safety, or 
that the mother’s conduct was extreme and outrageous.397 The 
appellate court affirmed, ruling that outside of abuse and ne-
glect, generally parents hold significant discretion in raising 
their children. This discretion protects even “bad parenting” 
unless it is extreme or outrageous. Prohibited parental conduct 
is that which is “so shocking as to form a basis for a claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.”398
This Article demonstrates that assimilation demands are 
examples of “shocking” mistreatment that goes beyond “bad 
parenting.” They constitute mistreatment that targets chil-
 
 
 393. Miner v. Garrity, No 1-10-3023, 2011 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2017, at 
*1 (July 29, 2011).  
 394. Id. 
 395. Id. 
 396. Id. at *2–8. 
 397. Id. at *14. 
 398. Id. at *34–35 (finding the mother’s “alleged actions are unpleasant 
and perhaps insensitive, and some would arguably fall outside the realm of 
‘good mothering,’ but they are not so shocking as to form a basis for a claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress”). 
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dren’s core sense-of-self and devalues it. While many of the cas-
es included in this Article were unable to explain why the pa-
rental conduct detailed was unacceptable, none of these cases 
found the disputes around assimilation demands and children’s 
identity to be frivolous or that parents who imposed assimila-
tion demands were merely being “bad parents.” 
  CONCLUSION   
Since Covering,399 legal scholars have paid considerable at-
tention to assimilation demands in the public sphere. Commen-
tators have written about assimilation demands on sexual-
minority identities in politics,400 the workplace,401 schools,402 and 
in communities of color.403
This Article’s purpose is twofold. First it articulates a mode 
of analysis based on assimilation demands. Framing children’s 
claims as identity interests would help courts reach outcomes 
that actually protect children’s identity interests, not just pur-
port to do so. Better crafted decisions and their outcomes would 
lead in turn to more coherence in the principles and legal tools 
that the opinions create. Second, this Article introduces ways in 
which the legal and welfare systems can help families overcome 
these conflicts. I propose a new exception to parental rights—
 This Article fills the gap in the 
scholarship and begins a conversation about assimilation de-
mands in the private sphere, namely, within families. By focus-
ing on the impact of parents’ assimilation demands on their 
children’s identities, this Article flows from the premise that as 
harmful as assimilation demands may be in the public sphere, 
they are even more harmful to children in the home, and can no 
longer remain neglected by the law. 
 
 399. YOSHINO, supra note 16, at 57. Yoshino criticizes pressures to assimi-
late into the mainstream, which he terms “assimilation demands,” as costly to 
one’s authentic self because they devalue a person’s sense-of-self and deny her 
the freedom to develop her identity independently of such pressures. Yoshino 
opposes these pressures when they are coercive and motivated by animus. For 
similar work on identity negotiation and performance, see generally Devon W. 
Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000). 
 400. See, e.g., Holning Lau, Identity Scripts & Democratic Deliberation, 94 
MINN. L. REV. 897 (2010). 
 401. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Discomfort at Work: Workplace Assimila-
tion Demands and the Contact Hypothesis, 86 N.C. L. REV. 379 (2009); Zachary 
A. Kramer, After Work, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 627 (2007). 
 402. See, e.g., Lau, supra note 11. 
 403. See, e.g., Russell K. Robinson, Uncovering Covering, 101 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1809 (2007). 
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FINS—and a test for courts to apply in order to identify im-
permissible assimilation demands. 
Though this Article provides one potential legal solution, 
additional efforts may be needed. As the discussion here re-
veals, LGBT youth can benefit greatly from systemic and wide-
spread social change in the way sexual diversity in children is 
perceived. Another important implication of this work is its ap-
plication to other identity categories where children’s identities 
might diverge from their parents’. Even with its focus on chil-
dren’s sexual identity, this Article advocates a shift in the pa-
rental rights paradigm and challenges the assumption that 
parents do what is best for their children. This Article aspires 
to show how the law can encourage parents to support and love 
their children, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender 
identity, so that children may flourish and become masters of 
their own destinies. 
